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ABSTRACT
The paper argues that the market signiﬁcantly overvalues ﬁrms with severely underfunded pen-
sion plans. These companies earn lower stock returns than ﬁrms with healthier pension plans
for at least ﬁve years after the ﬁrst emergence of the underfunding. The low returns are not
explained by risk, price momentum, earnings momentum, or accruals. Further, the evidence
suggests that investors do not anticipate the impact of the pension liability on future earnings,
and they are surprised when the negative implications of underfunding ultimately material-
ize. Finally, underfunded ﬁrms have poor operating performance, and they earn low returns,
although they are value companies.
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(BEC2002-00429 Grant) and from the BBVA Foundation.The combination of a deep bear stock market and a sharp fall in interest rates during the period
2000 to 2002 has resulted in a $400 billion deterioration of the funding status of deﬁned beneﬁt
(DB) pension plans in the U.S. The gravity of this phenomenon is such that the research divisions of
several investment ﬁrms started the calendar year 2003 with a report on corporate pension funding
and accounting. As one might expect, the main theme of these reports is whether or not current
market valuations correctly reﬂect this liability and its implicatons for future corporate cash ﬂows.1
The correct valuation of the corporate pension liability does not concern only stock market
eﬃciency; indeed it has macroeconomic implications. Unlike continental Europe and Japan, the
U.S. pension system has shifted most of the burden of providing income for people’s retirement
from the public to the private sector. In particular, the U.S. system is special in its heavy reliance
on pension plans in which companies, rather than individuals or the public sector, bear all the
responsibility of the provision of funding for employee retirement. Although economists and the
media have mostly focused on the serious dangers that public pension systems currently face, such
as the increase in longevity and the fall in birth rates, we cannot take for granted that the U.S.
private pension system does not face problems. At the heart of the viability and the eﬃciency
of the U.S. system is the correct pricing of companies, so that the ﬂow of savings into corporate
securities is not distorted and eﬃcient levels of corporate investment in capital and employment
are obtained. The relationship between corporate pension provision and economic eﬃciency is
described in Bulow, Morck, and Summers (1987):
The question of how the stock market values pension assets and liabilities is of
central importance to corporate decision makers, ﬁnancial economists and economists
concerned with [the] level of national savings. If investors treat pension debt diﬀerent
from other forms of debt, in valuing ﬁrms, prudent value maximizing managers should
recognize these diﬀerences and adjust their pension funding policies accordingly. A
convincing demonstration that market valuations failed to take account of pension assets
or liabilities would either challenge prevailing theories of market eﬃciency and rational
valuation, or force a re-examination of conventional views about eﬀective ownership
of pension claims. Finally, if potential beneﬁciaries of pensions recognized the value
of the pensions and adjusted their savings accordingly, but no comparable adjustment
occurred because holders of pension liabilities did not recognize their liabilities [...], then
pensions would reduce national savings.
1This article ﬁnds evidence of signiﬁcant overvaluation for companies with large deﬁcits in their
DB pension plans. When we sort companies into portfolios on the basis of the funding level of
their pension plan, the decile portfolio of most underfunded companies earns lower returns than
portfolios of ﬁrms with healthier pension plans. Adjusting for risk makes the gap even larger,
as severely underfunded ﬁrms have relatively high loadings on the three Fama and French (1993)
factors. The estimated underperformance for the most underfunded portfolio with respect to the
three-factor model can be as large as 10.6% annually. The returns are persistently low for at least
ﬁve years after the emergence of underfunding.
Using time-series and cross-sectional tests, and relying on other descriptive evidence, we con-
clude that this ﬁnding is not the eﬀect of known asset pricing anomalies such as price momentum
(Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)), earnings momentum (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996)),
or accruals (Sloan (1996)). Instead, as we explain below, we believe the overvaluation follows from
the fact that investors do not take into account the negative implications of pension plan under-
funding for future earnings and cash ﬂows until they actually materialize in the income statement.
Consistent with this interpretation, we provide signiﬁcant evidence that the market is negatively
surprised by the low earnings of underfunded ﬁrms.
By looking at several measures of operating and ﬁnancial performance, we characterize the
most underfunded companies as poor performers. This fact, along with the evidence that they
have high book-to-market (B/M) ratios, characterizes the mispricing that identify in this paper as
an anomaly that is inherently diﬀerent from the “value vs. growth puzzle.” Severely underfunded
companies are poor past performers, which, unlike other high B/M ﬁrms, seem to be overvalued.
We believe that the implications of this result for the debate on the nature of the value premium
are far-reaching.
In a DB pension plan, the assets are represented by the contributions made by the sponsoring
ﬁrm over the life of the plan. As these contributions are normally invested in traded assets, they
are valued at their market prices. The liability of a pension plan is the discounted value of all future
pension obligations. The discount rate is chosen by the company and it is related to the level of
interest rates. A pension plan underfunding occurs when the value of liabilities exceeds the value
of assets. It can materialize as a consequence of a decline in the market value of pension assets,
of a decrease of the rate at which future obligations are discounted, or simply because the value
of new contributions is not enough to cover new obligations. In any case, the deﬁcit in the plan
represents a true liability for the sponsoring company both in economic and accounting terms, as
2it has to appear on the balance sheet.2
There are two main channels through which pension liabilities aﬀect earnings and cash ﬂows.
First, according to accounting regulations, if a loss emerges in a pension plan as a consequence of
reduced assets or increased liabilities and the loss is larger than 10% of the maximum between the
two items, then the company is obliged to amortize the loss starting from the next ﬁscal year.3
This amortization decreases earnings of ﬁrms with severely underfunded plans. Cash ﬂows are also
reduced if at the same time the company makes a ﬁnancial contribution to the plan. Secondly,
the Employee Retirement Income Act (ERISA) of 1974, which protects workers’ interests in the
solvency of the plan, imposes a mandatory contribution if the plan is severely underfunded.4 In
this case, the sponsoring company is required to make up the deﬁcit within three to ﬁve years of
its emergence. Overall, the institutional environment causes large pension liabilities to ultimately
aﬀect earnings and cash ﬂows. The crucial point is that this impact may not be immediate, but it
can be delayed to the year following the ﬁrst emergence, and can hit earnings and cash ﬂows even
ﬁve years later. Also important, the discretion with which the ﬁrm may decided both the amount
of the amortization and the contributions to the plan, along with the intricate set of accounting
and ﬁscal regulations, make the impact of the pension liability diﬃcult to assess ex ante.
In our view, these institutional features play a major role in the emergence of the overvaluation
of underfunded ﬁrms and the subsequent negative earnings surprises and price adjustments. The
reason behind the overvaluation is that investors do not fully incorporate into prices the negative
impact of a large pension liability on future earnings and cash ﬂows. When the pension liability
starts to aﬀect earnings and cash ﬂows, the market appears to be negatively surprised. In this sense,
the evidence of low returns for companies with high past underfunding would be a manifestation
of the price adjustment that follows the negative surprises. Moreover, the fact that the impact
of a large pension underfunding on earnings and cash ﬂows can manifest up to ﬁve years after its
occurrence would explain why returns are persistently low for a number of years.
We provide abundant evidence in support of this interpretation. First, several indicators sug-
gest that a negative earnings surprise can be predicted for companies with large past underfunding.
We ﬁnd that these ﬁrms have negative raw and risk-adjusted returns around future earnings an-
nouncements, negative standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), and downward revisions in analyst
forecasts of earnings. Secondly, earnings and cash ﬂows deteriorate in the year after the emergence
of a large underfunding, and this phenomenon is not accompanied by a decrease in the growth rate
of sales. In other words, there are factors outside the normal operations of the ﬁrm that cause the
3poor economic result. We believe that these factors are the amortization of the pension loss and
the contributions to the plan.
On the other hand, there is no evidence of a symmetric eﬀect for ﬁrms with overfunded pension
plans. This is not surprising and can be explained on the basis of existing theories of manager
short-termism (see, for example, Stein (1989)). Since the ﬁrm can use the overfunding to increase
current earnings and cash ﬂows, it is likely that there is no delay between the materialization of
the overfunding and its positive impact on the economic performance of the ﬁrm.
A priori, we can identify a number of factors that potentially magnify the mispricing related to
a given level of underfunding. First, and most obvious, a given dollar amount of pension liability
has diﬀerent relevance depending on the potential of a company to generate future cash ﬂows that
are needed to cover the shortfall in the pension plan. Since market value is related to future cash
ﬂows, the same amount of underfunding should have less importance for a larger company. Second,
if indeed the market does not pay enough attention to pension information, the mispricing is likely
to emerge among those companies for which there is less information diﬀusion, that is, smaller
companies. Finally, the same percentage decline in cash ﬂows can have a larger impact on the
market value of a ﬁrm that relies more heavily on cash ﬂows to ﬁnance projects with positive net
present value (NPV). In other words, credit constraints can magnify the price impact of a given
surprise in earnings. In this sense, the most likely candidates for a large mispricing are small ﬁrms
and distressed ﬁrms because companies in these two categories are known to have more binding
credit constraints.
These considerations are relevant when constructing an index of pension plan funding level.
In particular, the arguments in the previous paragraph suggest that the appropriate variable for
scaling the dollar amount of pension liability is market value. Market capitalization is correlated
with a ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂows, information diﬀusion (for example, through analyst coverage), and
credit constraints. For this reason, the measure of funding status that we choose is the diﬀerence
between assets and liabilities in the pension plan, scaled by the ﬁrm’s market capitalization. The
main results in the paper are obtained using this sorting variable.
It is reassuring, however, to ﬁnd evidence of mispricing also when the scaling variable in the
index of funding status is total assets. The fact that the magnitudes are somewhat smaller with this
alternative measure corroborates the view that scaling by market capitalization selects the most
likely candidates for mispricing. In particular, we argue that some highly levered, and presumably
ﬁnancially distressed, ﬁrms drop out of the extreme portfolios if the scaling variable is total assets.
4In our view, the magnifying eﬀect of credit constraints is stronger when market capitalization is in
the denominator rather than total assets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I draws the link between this work and
previous literature. Section II deﬁnes and summarizes the pension plan variables that are relevant
for our analysis. Section III documents the fact that the most underfunded ﬁrms earn lower raw
returns, and have a discount in their risk-adjusted returns. Section IV provides support for our
interpretation of the mispricing by looking at several measures of earnings surprises. Section V
characterizes the ﬁrms in our portfolios on the basis of their operating and ﬁnancial performance.
Section VI veriﬁes that the observed mispricing is not absorbed by other known asset pricing
anomalies in a cross-sectional framework. Also, Section VI presents robustness checks in which
similar evidence is obtained using an alternative measure of funding status, and the results are
articulated by size groups. Finally, Section VII proposes some insight for regulators and draws the
conclusions of this work.
I. Relation to Previous Literature
This paper relates to two main strands of the literature. On the one hand, there is the work
concerned with asset pricing anomalies. On the other hand, our paper addresses the old issue of
the eﬃcient valuation of pension liabilities, which is relevant from the point of view of corporate
ﬁnance, public ﬁnance, and macroeconomics.
In terms of asset pricing, we believe the mispricing we ﬁnd is similar in nature to other anomalies
explored in the literature, such as the post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD), ﬁrst reported in
Ball and Brown (1968) and later corroborated by Bernard and Thomas (1990), and the accrual
anomaly described by Sloan (1996) and more recently by Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok
(2004). In Bernard and Thomas’ (1990) explanation of the PEAD, investors do not anticipate
the fact that quarterly earnings are autocorrelated, so they are systematically surprised when high
earnings in one quarter are followed by high earnings in the next quarters. Sloan (1996) documents
a negative relation between accruals, the diﬀerence between earnings and cash ﬂows, and future
returns, and argues that the market does not anticipate the fact that the accrual component of
earnings will revert.
These anomalies, like the one we document, seem to depend on the failure of investors to
fully exploit publicly available information. In particular, there is information in a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
5statements that has implications for future earnings, but which is not impounded into prices until
the impact on future earnings ﬁnally manifests. The component of the mispricing that we identify
relates to the fact that the neglected information concerns a liability of the company, rather than the
quality of current earnings. The explanation we propose for our result is in line with the observation
in Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2004) that the market ﬁxates on bottom-line earnings
and neglects other relevant information, which in this case is pension plan funding.
The results in Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) and Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) are also
consistent with our ﬁndings. In connection with momentum, they suggest that the market slowly
impounds earnings news into prices, with negative information taking even longer to spread in the
market. Our evidence of persistently lower returns for severely underfunded ﬁrms also suggests
that bad news, that is, pension plan underfunding, takes more time to be fully incorporated into
prices.
A ﬁnal issue regarding asset pricing is that the results obtained in this paper are also relevant
to the debate on the value premium. In particular, underfunded companies display poor past
operating performance and high book-to-market ratios. Unlike other value ﬁrms, however, they
are overvalued rather than undervalued. The immediate implication is that the value premium can
be magniﬁed by excluding underfunded ﬁrms from the value portfolios. Also, it seems that the
belief that ﬁrms with poor past performance are generally undervalued needs to be at least in part
reconsidered.
In terms of the valuation of the pension liability, the evidence that we present in this paper
seems to be in sharp contrast with the conclusions of earlier work (Feldstein and Seligman (1981),
Feldstein and Morck (1983), Bulow, Morck and Summers (1987)). These studies conclude that the
market takes into account pension liabilities when valuing a company, and that the valuation is
correct.
Besides the fact that we use a much longer and more recent sample, there are other ways to
interpret the diﬀerence between our results and those of these previous studies. The methodology of
this earlier literature consists of regressing market value on its possible determinants, as suggested
by either a Tobin’s Q model or a discounted cash ﬂow model. Among the determinants, these
authors use the funding status of DB pension plans. Taking into account taxes and other issues,
the theory suggests that a one-dollar increase in pension plan funding should increase the market
value of the company by about one dollar.5 Since the hypothesis of a coeﬃcient on pension plan
funding equal to one cannot be rejected, these studies conclude that the market correctly evaluates
6the pension plan funding status. In fact, given the size of their standard errors, a coeﬃcient
smaller than one cannot be excluded either, and thus our evidence of overvaluation would not be
rejected in the context of those studies. More generally, the approach followed by this literature
does not allow one to draw inferences on the eﬃciency of market valuation because the omission
and mismeasurement of relevant determinants of company value, as well as the endogeneity of the
funding status, are bound to bias the coeﬃcient on the funding status.
Our methodology, which is more typical of asset pricing studies, circumvents these issues as
it investigates the determinants of expected returns, rather than of market value. In particular,
to draw our inference of mispricing we rely on deviations of the measured average returns from
the expected return predicted by a factor pricing model. Obviously, our conclusion of ineﬃcient
market valuation is contingent on having chosen the correct asset pricing model (joint hypothesis
problem, Fama (1970)). However, we also provide evidence of signiﬁcant market surprises around
earnings announcements. As argued by Fama (1991), given the short window around which returns
are measured in an event study, the asset pricing model chosen as a benchmark is less relevant, and
we can get as close as possible to a pure test of the eﬃcient market hypothesis.
II. The Pension Plan Data
A. Variable Deﬁnitions
We obtain the accounting items related to deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension plans from Compustat.
The variables of interest correspond to diﬀerent accounting items over the years, and are initially
available in 1980. In particular, we use accounting data to construct the equivalent of two pension
plan elements, namely the fair value of plan assets (FVPA) and the projected beneﬁt obligation
(PBO). In Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87 (SFAS 87) these two items are
deﬁned as follows:
• The FVPA represents the market value of the assets (stocks, bonds, and other investments)
that are set aside and restricted (usually in a trust) to pay beneﬁts when due. Plan as-
sets include amounts contributed by the employer plus amounts earned from investing the
contributions, less beneﬁts paid.
• The PBO represents the actuarial present value of vested and nonvested beneﬁts earned by an
employee for service rendered to date plus projected beneﬁts attributable to salary increases.
7The amount of beneﬁts is determined by the plan’s pension beneﬁt formula, which establishes
the payments that participants are entitled to receive. The measurement of the accumulated
beneﬁt obligation is based on current and past compensation levels. To compute the PBO the
company makes an assumption on the expected increase in salaries for the employees covered
by the plan, and computes the beneﬁts that result from the salary increase using the beneﬁt
formula.
For accounting purposes, and in the rest of the paper, a pension plan is deﬁned to be overfunded
(underfunded) if the FVPA is larger (smaller) than the PBO. A company can sponsor both over-
funded and underfunded pension plans. In the Appendix, we describe in detail the construction of
the FVPA and PBO series from the available accounting items. The two series range from 1980 to
2002.
The deﬁnition of the variable we use to capture a ﬁrm’s funding status deserves a separate
discussion. We are interested in the eventual impact of the funding level of the pension plan on
ﬁrm value through its impact on earnings and cash ﬂows. Obviously, the same dollar amount of
underfunding has diﬀerent implications for these variables depending on the size of the company.
Therefore, the diﬀerence between the FVPA and the PBO needs to be appropriately normalized.
Given the discussion in the introduction, there are several reasons to expect that the mispricing
that originates from underfunding is magniﬁed by a factor that is inversely related to size. Hence,
we choose to divide the diﬀerence between the FVPA and the PBO by market capitalization in
December of the calendar year in which the pension items are measured, and we denote this variable





A relevant criticism to normalization by market value is that this ratio could capture eﬀects
that are related to the company’s book-to-market (B/M) ratio. In particular, for companies with
positive FR, a higher level of FR could correspond to a higher B/M ratio, without necessarily
implying a better funding status.6 So, companies with high (and positive) FR could earn high
returns just because they are value ﬁrms. This argument is similar in spirit to the point made by
Berk (1995), who suggests that using a price multiple as a sorting variable mechanically induces a
relation with expected returns, and therefore with average returns.
As will be evident further on, by focusing on underfunded ﬁrms, our research design eﬀectively
circumvents this problem. By an argument similar to the one just above, a very negative FRcould
8hide a high B/M ratio. Accordingly, a stock with very low and negative FR should earn high
returns, as it signals a value company. Given that we ﬁnd that highly underfunded companies earn
low returns, the value eﬀect is not possibly what drives our results.
An alternative research design would be to normalize the same numerator by an accounting
variable such as total assets or book value. In Section VI, we present results that use total assets
as the denominator. Scaling by total assets removes from the most underfunded portfolio those
companies that are most likely to be mispriced. This argument is discussed in more detail in
Section VI.
B. Overview of Pension Plan Elements
It is interesting to look at the historical evolution of pension plan funding for companies with DB
plans. Figure 1 reports the time series of the aggregate funding level for all the companies in Com-
pustat with available pension items. The funding level is the diﬀerence between aggregate assets
and PBO. As is evident from Figure 1, the DB pension system displays an aggregate underfunding
for the ﬁrst time in our sample in the years between 1993 and 1995. Concurrent with the bull
market of the second half of the 1990s, pension plan assets grew more than beneﬁts, peaked in
2000 at almost $1.8 trillion. The contemporaneous slight decrease in aggregate beneﬁts caused the
aggregate funding level to peak in ﬁscal year 1999 with an aggregate overfunding of about $262
billion. In the years between 2000 and 2002, the decline in the stock market caused a 20% fall in
the value of pension plan assets, which culminated in ﬁscal year 2002 in an aggregate underfunding
of almost $380 billion. This astonishing deﬁcit in DB pension plans is at the root of the concerns
about the health of the DB pension system among analysts and regulators. FIGURE 1
HERE For the purpose of our asset pricing tests, we use accounting data up to the year 2002. The
companies included in our empirical analysis have to satisfy a number of selection criteria. The
criteria that we discuss in this section are common to all types of analysis that we perform in the
paper. From the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) monthly data set we select only
NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ ﬁrms with ordinary common equity. Therefore, we exclude ADRs,
REITs, and units of beneﬁcial interest. Moreover, to correct for the survival bias induced by the
way Compustat adds ﬁrms to its tapes (Banz and Breen (1986)), we do not include companies until
they have at least two years of accounting data. We also restrict our analysis to companies that
sponsor DB pension plans, which we identify as having available data for the pension accounting
items that we describe above. Finally, to correct for the eﬀect of outliers, we drop observations for
9each year in which the FR variable is more than ﬁve standard deviations away from the annual
mean.
There are 36,651 company-years in the sample between 1980 and 2002 that result from the
intersection of these requirements. The year with the minimum (maximum) number of ﬁrms is
2001 (1981) with 1,213 (1,883) companies. Table I presents summary statistics on the main pension
items and the FR for these companies. TABLE I
HERE The average PBO in the whole sample is about $440 million, which corresponds to about 91%
of the FVPA in the same period. The average funding level, as measured by FR, is about 1%, the
same as the median. This ﬁgure results from combining highly overfunded and highly underfunded
companies. The minimum FR is -987%, while the maximum is 572%. The performance of the
stock market aﬀects the evolution of the funding status of companies with a DB pension plan as,
on average, about 60% of the plan assets are invested in stocks.7 The funding status has been
deteriorating over time, as liabilities have grown at a faster pace than assets. The average assets in
a plan grew by about 2.7 times in the 1991 to 2002 sample relative to the previous decade, while
the average pension obligation grew more than proportionally (2.96 times). This evolution caused
the average FR to drop from 2% to -1%.
III. Portfolio Analysis
In this section we sort ﬁrms into portfolios according to the level of FR. We form eleven port-
folios. The ﬁrst ten portfolios contain only underfunded ﬁrms (FR<0) in a given year, while the
eleventh portfolio is composed of all overfunded ﬁrms (FR≥0), which we include in the analysis as
a benchmark and for completeness.
Notice that because our main focus is on companies with negative FR, we avoid the problem
mentioned in Section II concerning the possible relation between the level of FR and the discount
rate applied to the cash ﬂows of these ﬁrms. Given that market value is the denominator, companies
with very low and negative FRare more likely to have high expected returns. Hence, our ﬁnding of
low returns for highly underfunded companies is not likely to be explained by a mechanical relation
between FR and the discount rate.
We examine the performance of these portfolios at diﬀerent horizons after portfolio formation
by looking at raw returns. We also provide evidence on the risk-adjusted returns of these trading
strategies.
10A. Portfolio Formation Procedure
Besides the criteria mentioned in Section II, the companies that we include in the portfolios have to
satisfy an additional selection criterion. To be included in the portfolio formed in year t aﬁ r mm u s t
have a nonmissing value for FRin the ﬁscal year ending in year t−1 (which implies a nonmissing
price in December of year t − 1).
In July of year t the selected companies are allocated to one of eleven groups according to their
FRin December of year t−1. The ﬁrst ten groups are formed using the deciles of the distribution
of FR for underfunded ﬁrms (FR<0), while the eleventh group includes all the overfunded ﬁrms
(FR≥0). In more detail, to form the ﬁrst ten groups, we use the break points of the FRdistribution
of NYSE ﬁrms with negative FR. We use NYSE break points, as in Fama and French (1993), in
order to avoid lower decile portfolios being entirely populated by smaller NASDAQ companies.
The ﬁrst portfolio contains the most underfunded ﬁrms, the tenth portfolio contains the least
underfunded ﬁrms, and the eleventh portfolio, which we denote OF, contains all the overfunded
ﬁrms.
We create the monthly portfolio return series by value-weighting or equally weighting the returns
of the companies in each group from July of year t to June of year t + 1. Choosing July of year t
as the portfolio formation date ensures that the accounting information for the ﬁscal year ending
in year t − 1 is available to the market (Fama and French (1993)). If a company is delisted for
performance reasons, the delisting return is used if available, and then the company is dropped from
the portfolio. As mentioned above, companies for which FRis more than ﬁve standard deviations
from the annual mean are not included in the portfolios. Portfolios are reformed annually. The
available monthly portfolio returns range from July 1981 to December 2003.
Table II reports descriptive statistics on the composition of the eleven portfolios and their
returns. A thorough characterization of these companies in terms of their past earnings and other
measures of performance is provided in Section V. The characteristics in Panel A are measured in
December of t−1 relative to portfolio formation. There is wide dispersion in the average level of FR
across portfolios. For the most underfunded ﬁrms (portfolio one) the average FR is about -46%,
while for the least underfunded ones (portfolio ten) it is only about -0.1%. This portfolio therefore
includes ﬁrms for which the underfunding is eﬀectively very small. The OF portfolio includes all
overfunded ﬁrms, and the average level of FRis 6%. The average size of the companies in the ﬁrst
ten portfolios increases almost uniformly. The opposite is true for B/M, as most value ﬁrms are
in portfolio one. This observation is relevant in contrasting our ﬁndings with the value premium.
11Notice, ﬁnally, that the OF portfolio contains on average a much higher number of ﬁrms than the
other portfolios. TABLE II
HERE Panel B of Table II reports means and standard deviations for the returns of both value-
weighted (VW) and equally weighted (EW) portfolios for the 270 months between July 1981 and
December 2003. In anticipation of the main ﬁnding of this paper, we observe that the portfolio
of the most underfunded ﬁrms has the lowest average monthly returns, in spite of the highest
standard deviation, both in the VW and EW case. Notice that the low standard deviation of the
OF is possibly related to the high number of ﬁrms in the portfolio, which provides a high degree
of diversiﬁcation.
Finally, Panel C of Table II provides means and standard deviations for the factors used in
the time-series regressions.8 The EXM, HML, and SMB factors are constructed as in Fama and
French (1993), and are respectively the market portfolio minus the risk-free rate, a portfolio long in
high B/M and short in low B/M ﬁrms, and a portfolio long in small and short in large companies.
The momentum factor (UMD) is constructed as a long investment in past twelve-month winners
and a short investment in past twelve-month losers; its inclusion is justiﬁed by the evidence in
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) that past winners continue to gain extra returns over past losers
within a one-year horizon.
B. Raw Returns
Table III reports compound returns at diﬀerent horizons for both VW (Panel A) and EW (Panel B)
portfolios. By looking at Panel A, we notice that in the ﬁrst semester after formation (S1), portfolio
one earns a negative return of about -0.55%. The diﬀerence in returns between portfolio one and the
OF portfolio in this period is about 5.77%. The fact that the average return for the portfolio of the
most underfunded companies is negative suggests that the cause of its low returns is probably related
to mispricing; this impression is strengthened by the evidence of market surprises in Section IV.
Over the same six-month horizon, portfolios two and three also earn low returns compared to the
rest of the universe of stocks. Overall, there is nonmonotonicity in average returns with respect to
portfolio ordering, which clearly indicates that only extreme levels of underfunding produce returns
that are signiﬁcantly lower. TABLE III
HERE In the ﬁrst year after portfolio formation (Y1), the diﬀerence in compound returns between the
OF portfolio and portfolio one decreases to 4.58%. Evidently, most of the return diﬀerence in year
one is produced in the ﬁrst six months. Portfolio two still earns lower returns, but for this portfolio
12the diﬀerence in returns compared to the rest of the stocks tends to vanish with time. Instead, the
striking result is that the ﬁrst portfolio continues to earn comparatively low returns even ﬁve years
after portfolio formation. This result acquires even more relevance when considering that ﬁrms in
portfolio one are small and value companies and as such should earn high average returns.
The situation for EW portfolios in Panel B is consistent with the evidence in Panel A. The main
diﬀerence is that portfolio one returns in the ﬁrst six months are even smaller (-4.02%) and that
portfolio two also earns negative returns (-1.50%) over the same horizon. These results suggest
that underfunding is associated with comparatively lower returns in the case of smaller ﬁrms, at
least in the early period after portfolio formation.
Overall, the evidence from raw returns is consistent with the mispricing view that we propose
in the introduction. In particular, the negative returns in the ﬁrst period after portfolio formation
suggest that investors are surprised by negative information. This impression is conﬁrmed by the
analysis of returns around earnings announcements in Section IV. Furthermore, the fact that low
returns for the portfolio of mostly underfunded ﬁrms persist even ﬁve years after formation is also
consistent with our interpretation. As we mention in the introduction, ERISA imposes on severely
underfunded ﬁrms the obligation to contribute over a three- to ﬁve-year period. This implies that
the surprises will not materialize in a single moment, but rather will be spread over several periods
as amortizations and contributions aﬀect earnings and cash ﬂows. This gradual adjustment of
returns to pension funding information is also possible due to the persistence in underfunding: if
the underfunding was short lived or exhibited fast reversals then the sequence of surprises would
not materialize.9
C. Risk-Adjusted Returns
We point out above that underfunded companies, on average small and value companies, should
have high expected returns. Therefore, the evidence of low returns for the low FR portfolios is
not likely to be explained by risk factors related to size or B/M. However, one can formally test
that these portfolios earn low risk-adjusted returns by running time-series regressions of portfolio
returns on the returns on diﬀerent factors, including the market. A priori a diﬀerence in returns
among the portfolios could be explained by diﬀerent factor loadings.
Table IV reports alphas, factor loadings, and R2 of the time-series regressions
Rit = αi + biEXMt + hiHMLt + siSMBt + εit, (2)
where Rit is the portfolio excess return. The estimation sample is July 1981 to December 2003. TABLE IV
HERE.
13From Panel A we infer that returns are signiﬁcantly negative once we control for the eﬀect of
known factors. Portfolios one and two have signiﬁcantly negative intercepts, both in the VW and
EW cases. For example, the VW portfolio one has a signiﬁcantly negative alpha of -0.89% monthly,
which amounts to about 10.6% annually. Consistent with the results for raw returns, there seems
to be no clear pattern in the alphas beyond the ﬁrst two portfolios. Notice in particular that the
alpha of the OF portfolio is not very far from zero. This result persists also when highly overfunded
companies (top decile) are isolated in a portfolio (results not reported). This evidence suggests that
the eﬀect of the funding status is not symmetric between under- and overfunded ﬁrms. A possible
explanation for this asymmetry is provided by short-termism, which causes managers to anticipate
the gains from a surplus in the pension plan.
Panel B shows that the most underfunded portfolios not only have higher loadings on HML
and SMB, as one would expect given their size and B/M, but they also have higher market betas.
Consequently, adjusting for risk increases the wedge between the returns of the most underfunded
companies and most overfunded.
Another known pattern in returns is momentum. There is evidence that past winners tend
to outperform past losers in the following year (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)). In Section V, we
present evidence that the most underfunded companies tend to have poor past operational perfor-
mance. A reasonable concern is that the underperformance of the most underfunded companies can
be driven by momentum. There are a number of ways to address this concern. A ﬁrst reply is that
momentum is a short-lived phenomenon (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996)), whereas we
have shown that the underperformance of severely underfunded companies is long-lasting (at least
up to ﬁve years after portfolio formation). Later, in Section VI, we also control for diﬀerent types
of momentum in a cross-sectional setting, and show that the explanatory power of FR survives.
Here, we include a momentum factor in the time-series regressions by estimating the model
Rit = αi + biEXMt + hiHMLt + siSMBt + miUMDt + εit. (3)
Table V reports alphas, factor loadings, and R2 for the four-factor model in Equation (3).
Although the momentum factor can account for a fraction of the alphas, Panel A shows that the
mispricing of the most underfunded portfolios is still large. In particular, the VW portfolio one
still has a very negative alpha (-0.76%), which is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Momentum seems to
have a larger impact on EW portfolios, as the alpha of portfolio one drops to -0.35%. This fact
is consistent with the evidence that momentum is more relevant among smaller companies (Hong,
Lim, and Stein (2001)). TABLE V
HERE.
14Panel B of Table V shows that the most underfunded companies have negative UMD loadings,
suggesting that these stocks behave like momentum losers. This ﬁnding is not surprising, espe-
cially in light of the evidence presented below (see Section V, and Panel A of Table VII), which
shows that the most underfunded companies have the lowest returns in the year before portfolio
formation. Given the already mentioned persistence in the degree of underfunding, it is possible
that the negative surprises, which cause the observed negative returns for underfunded ﬁrms, occur
repeatedly for a few years in a row. This fact is partly captured by a negative correlation with
the momentum factor, but has a foundation in the negative impact on earnings of the pension
liability. Overall, the evidence in Table V, together with the results we present later, suggests that
the mispricing identiﬁed by the funding level is in large part of a diﬀerent nature than momentum.
A recent paper by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) points out that stocks with high loadings on an
aggregate liquidity factor earn signiﬁcantly higher abnormal returns than stocks with low liquidity
betas. These authors argue that this extra-return remunerates investors for the risk of holding
assets that have low returns, and possibly require liquidation, in periods when market liquidity is
low. We want to investigate the possibility that the mispricing of our FR portfolios is related to
the liquidity risk pointed out by Pastor and Stambaugh. We re-estimate the asset pricing models
in Tables IV and V including Pastor and Stambaugh’s spread portfolio, which is constructed as
the return on high liquidity beta stocks minus the return on low liquidity beta stocks. The results,
which we do not report to save space, indicate that the mispricing of our portfolios is only slightly
aﬀected by the inclusion of the liquidity factor. The portfolio of most underfunded ﬁrms has a
signiﬁcantly negative loading on the new factor, and its alpha is reduced by about 30% when this
factor is included in the model, but it remains signiﬁcant. The highest FRportfolios have positive
and insigniﬁcant loadings, while OF loads negatively on the liquidity factor. Overall, this evidence
indicates that a large part of the returns of severely underfunded ﬁrms is not explained by Pastor
and Stambaugh’s (2003) liquidity risk.
To summarize, the evidence presented in this section suggests that the most underfunded com-
panies have persistently lower returns than companies that have a healthy funding status in their
pension plan. The diﬀerence in returns is not explained by market risk, B/M, size, or momentum.
The next step is to provide evidence of market surprises for the portfolios of most underfunded
ﬁrms.
15IV. Evidence of Market Surprises
The economic story that we believe to be behind the observed overvaluation of severely underfunded
companies is spelled out in the introduction. Here, we summarize the testable implication of this
argument.
For a number of reasons that are partly related to operating performance, and which we consider
as exogenous to this discussion, ﬁrms develop either a deﬁcit or a surplus in their pension plan.
If managers are to some extent driven by short-term considerations, they have an incentive to
immediately recognize the pension plan surplus in the income statement of the ﬁscal year in which
it materializes. On the other hand, there is an incentive to postpone the recognition of a loss in
the pension liability. Nonetheless, if the loss is very large (above 10% of the maximum between
PBO and FVPA), the ﬁrm is obliged to amortize it in the ﬁscal year following the one in which
it materializes. The amortization of the pension loss and the contributions to the pension plan
decrease earnings and cash ﬂows of severely underfunded companies in the year following the ﬁrst
occurrence of the large underfunding.
We hypothesize that the reason why severely underfunded ﬁrms experience abnormally low
returns is that the market is surprised when the implications of the pension underfunding hit
earnings and cash ﬂows. That is, while the market pays attention to earnings and cash ﬂow ﬁgures
when valuing companies, it does not pay enough attention to pension liabilities.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the causes of this myopic focus on earnings.
Suﬃce it to say that there is a consensus in the ﬁnance literature about the fact that investors
pay a disproportionate attention to earnings relative to the other items in a company’s ﬁnancial
statements. For example, Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2004) argue that the almost
exclusive focus on bottom-line earnings is at the basis of the so-called accrual anomaly (Sloan
(1996)).
For our purpose, the relevant implication of this story is that the market surprise should be
observable around earnings announcements. If earnings in the year following the appearance of the
pension liability are lower than expected by investors, then severely underfunded ﬁrms should have
predictably negative price surprises around earnings announcements. To test this implication, we
compute price reactions around earnings announcements in two ways. One measure is simply the
cumulative stock returns in the three days around the announcement (from t − 1t ot +1 ) . F o r





where rij is stock i’s return on day j (with earnings being announced on day 0). We average CRit
across the stocks in the portfolio over the period under consideration (either a quarter or a year).
This measure is unadjusted for risk. The other measure is also a cumulative stock return in the
same three-day window, but the daily stock returns are adjusted for risk using the daily returns on
the three Fama and French (1993) factors. For stock i in period t the adjusted cumulative return




(rij − biEXMj − hiHMLj − siSMLj), (5)
where EXMj, HMLj,a n dSMLj are the day-jth returns on the three factors. We impute to
each stock the factor loadings (bi, hi,a n dsi)o ft h eFR portfolio to which it belongs during the
formation period. These loadings are estimated using the full sample of portfolio returns and are
the ones reported in Panel B of Table IV. The adjustment is meant to take care of the fact that the
most underfunded companies have high loadings on the market, HML, and SMB, and as such they
earn high expected returns, which could conceal the negative surprise. Again, the stock returns
around the announcements are averaged across stocks in the portfolio over the period of interest.
The second implication is that, if one forms expectations of future earnings based on past
earnings only, there should be negative surprises associated with the most underfunded ﬁrms. Con-
sequently, a consistent measure of earnings surprise is the commonly used standardized unexpected
earnings (SUE). Following Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996), the assumed model for ex-





where eit is quarterly earnings in quarter t, eit−4 is quarterly earnings four quarters before, and
σit is the standard deviation of unexpected earnings, eit −eit−4, over the preceding eight quarters.
The ﬁrm SUE are averaged across companies in the portfolio over the period of interest.
The third measure of earnings surprise is given by the revision in analysts’ forecasts of earn-
ings. If the implications of the pension liability are not taken into account, analysts should revise
downward their forecasts of future earnings of the most underfunded ﬁrms as the earnings release
17date approaches, and this revision should be larger than for the other companies. As in Chan,
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996), we deﬁne the revision in month t for stock i as the change in





where fit is the median I/B/E/S estimate in month t of ﬁrm’s i’s earnings for the current ﬁscal
year, and pit−1 is the stock price in month t − 1.10 The revisions are averaged across stocks in a
given month and then summed over the period of interest.
Each measure of surprise has some advantage over the others. For example, SUE capture
expectations over a longer period than the other two measures, however, the expectations in SUE
are based on the assumption of a speciﬁc model for earnings. Analysts’ revisions, meanwhile,
could be driven by the incentive to generate brokerage commissions or investment banking fees.
Therefore, it is worthwhile to consider the diﬀerent indicators simultaneously.
Panel A of Table VI reports the portfolio cumulative returns around earnings announcements.
The most striking result is that in the ﬁrst quarter after portfolio formation both portfolio one
and two have negative price reactions. This ﬁnding represents strong evidence of the market being
negatively surprised by earnings announcements, especially if one considers that the other portfolios
earn positive returns during the same period. For portfolio one the negative return persists one
year after formation, and in this case the diﬀerence in returns with the OF portfolio is statistically
diﬀerent from zero. In general, the most underfunded stocks continue to have the lowest returns
around earnings announcements up to ﬁve years after portfolio formation, consistent with the
results using raw returns in Table III. TABLE VI
HERE Panel B of Table VI reports risk-adjusted returns around earnings announcements and reinforces
the impression from Panel A. Here, the diﬀerence in returns between portfolios one and OF is
signiﬁcant in quarter one, in year one, and in year ﬁve after portfolio formation. Besides, in all
the periods that are considered, the portfolio of the most underfunded companies has negative
risk-adjusted returns around earnings announcements. Evidently, correcting for risk accounts for
the fact that these companies are small and value ﬁrms with high market betas.
Moving to the SUE evidence in Panel C of Table VI, we ﬁnd further support for the negative
surprise hypothesis. The SUE for portfolios one and two are consistently the lowest in every period
that we consider after portfolio formation. Moreover, they are negative in the ﬁrst quarter and the
ﬁrst year after formation. The diﬀerence between the SUE of portfolio one and OF is signiﬁcantly
18diﬀerent from zero in all periods under consideration. Furthermore, in year ﬁve after formation,
portfolio one still displays negative SUE.
Finally, Panel D of Table VI reports results using the revisions in analysts’ forecasts. Consistent
with prior evidence (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996)) the average revision is negative
across the board, suggesting that analysts tend to be over optimistic about earnings. The relevant
point is that the portfolio with the most underfunded ﬁrms displays the largest negative revision
in all periods, and the diﬀerence in revisions with the OF portfolio is most of the time signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. Remarkably, the result in year ﬁve is still consistent with a long-lasting eﬀect
of underfunding on earnings and returns.
In conclusion, we believe the results on the persistence of the predictive power of FRcorroborate
the conjecture that we elaborate in the introduction. In particular, given that ERISA forces
the employer to fund highly underfunded pension obligations within three to ﬁve years, these
compulsory contributions can represent another source of surprise a few years down the road.
V. Portfolio Characteristics
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) argue that the value premium and the growth discount
are explained by overreaction to past operating performance. In that context, value companies
with a long history of poor earnings tend to be undervalued. On the other hand, Chan, Jegadeesh,
and Lakonishok (1996) show that ﬁrms with negative past operating performance continue to earn
low returns within a six-month horizon. They suggest that return momentum (Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993)) is at least partly due to underreaction to news contained in earnings. Furthermore,
there is evidence that the market does not understand that the part of earnings due to accruals
tends to reverse itself. Hence, high accruals are associated with low future returns (Sloan (1996),
Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (2004)). Given these results, in order to compare the
mispricing that this paper identiﬁes to previous anomalies, it is important to provide a description
of the companies in the FR portfolios in terms of their operating performance and other deﬁning
characteristics. Also, looking at operating performance can indicate why these ﬁrms developed a
pension liability.
First of all, we recall that according to Table II the most underfunded companies have the
smallest size and highest B/M ratio in the universe of DB companies that we consider. Moreover,
separate results conﬁrm that these characteristics persist at least up to ﬁve years before and after
19portfolio formation. Therefore, we can conﬁdently describe the most underfunded ﬁrms as being
relatively small and value.
Table VII, Panel A reports average portfolio returns in diﬀerent periods before portfolio forma-
tion. The goal, here, is to see whether the momentum anomaly can be related to the low returns of
underfunded companies. Indeed, we observe that in the three years before formation, the portfolio
of most underfunded companies earns the lowest returns. However, the striking ﬁnding is that in
the six months prior to formation the same portfolio earns the highest returns. As momentum is a
short-run phenomenon, this ﬁnding makes it unlikely that price momentum explains the low returns
of the underfunded portfolios after formation. This impression is conﬁrmed by the cross-sectional
analysis in Section VI. TABLE
VII
HERE
The ﬁnding that the most underfunded companies earn the highest returns in the six months
before formation (January to June) has to be interpreted in conjunction with the evidence that their
returns are lowest between July and December of year t−1. For example, portfolio one’s return is
about -12.4% between July and December of year t−1. We can think of two possible interpretations
of this evidence. First, it could be the case that at the end of year t − 1 investors start reacting to
the negative operating performance of severely underfunded companies (see Panels D to F of Table
VII). Then, possibly because of overreaction to poor earnings (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1994)), there is a correction of the initial negative surprise in the months between January and
June. The extent of this positive rebound is proportional to the magnitude of the initial negative
reaction. The second possible explanation has to do with tax-loss selling in December of year t−1.
Since the most underfunded companies are losers from the point of view of returns, they are the
most likely candidates for tax-loss selling by investors who seek to oﬀset capital gains from other
stocks in their portfolios. In this view, the rebound in prices during the ﬁrst months of year t
occurs because investors repurchase the stocks that they had sold in December of year t − 1.
Panel B of Table VII provides average portfolio SUE in diﬀerent periods before formation. The
purpose is to see whether there is a relation with earnings momentum. In general, the ﬁrst two FR
portfolios have negative SUE, consistent with deteriorating operating performance. However, the
second FR portfolio in the ﬁrst six months before formation does not have negative SUE, in spite
of poor returns after formation. This fact, along with the robustness checks in the cross-sectional
analysis of Section VI and the persistence of low returns several years after formation, works against
earnings momentum as the sole explanation for the ﬁndings of this paper.
Panel C of Table VII clearly testiﬁes to the lack of a relation between the low returns of
20underfunded companies and the accrual anomaly. The most underfunded companies have the
lowest accruals both before and after portfolio formation. Given that low accruals are normally
associated with high returns, it is unlikely that this anomaly explains the abnormally low returns
of severely underfunded companies. The cross-sectional analysis below conﬁrms this conclusion.
The rest of Table VII looks directly at operating and ﬁnancial performance. Panel D and
Panel E consider the ratios of earnings and cash ﬂows to total assets in diﬀerent periods before
and after portfolio formation. The choice of presenting scaled levels of earnings and cash ﬂows
is imposed by the fact that it is not possible to compute growth rates for these variables, as in
some years they are negative, even at the portfolio level. From these two panels it appears that
the two most underfunded portfolios tend to have the poorest operating performance before and
after formation. Furthermore, both earnings and cash ﬂows ratios are lower in the ﬁrst year after
formation for portfolios one and two, while this is not necessarily the case for the other portfolios.
This evidence is instructive for several reasons. First, poor past performance can be the reason
why these ﬁrms do not fund their pension liability in a timely manner and thereby develop a large
underfunding. Second, the fact that the operating performance worsens in the ﬁrst year after
formation is consistent with the pension liability negatively impacting earnings and cash ﬂows, and
corroborates our explanation of the observed low returns for underfunded companies.
Panel F of Table VII provides the growth rate of total sales for the companies in the port-
folios. Consistent with deteriorating earnings and cash ﬂows, the sales growth rate for the most
underfunded companies is lowest in the periods before portfolio formation. Since the sales ﬁgure
is less subject to managers’ manipulation, this result is more convincing about the poor operating
performance of severely underfunded ﬁrms than the results concerning earnings and cash ﬂows.
An important piece of evidence in Panel F concerns the periods after portfolio formation, when
the growth rates of sales for the most underfunded portfolios are not lower than those of the other
portfolios. This ﬁnding suggests that the reasons for the poor performance of earnings and cash
ﬂows are not necessarily found in normal operations. Instead, it supports the view that the poor
performance after portfolio formation is due to the amortization of the pension liability and the
contributions to the pension plan.
Finally, the last two panels of Table VII report two diﬀerent measures of company distress. In
Panel G there is Ohlson’s (1980) index of bankruptcy risk. A higher level of this index denotes
higher probability of default. Panel H reports Altman’s (1968) Z-score, which is inversely related
to bankruptcy risk.11 Both measures show that the portfolios of highly underfunded ﬁrms have the
21highest probability of default in all periods under consideration. Therefore, these companies can
be noted as relatively distressed both before and after portfolio formation.
The observation that severely underfunded companies are companies facing ﬁnancial trouble
is interesting for two reasons. First, it sheds further light on why these ﬁrms develop a large
unfunded pension liability. Possibly, they fund their other obligations by expanding the pension
liability. Second, it suggests that distress may play an amplifying role on the impact of pension
contributions on company value. We discuss this issue in detail in Section VI, when we consider
alternative measures of underfunding.
In conclusion, the analysis of the characteristics of underfunded companies identiﬁes the anomaly
presented in this paper as largely independent of previous ﬁndings. Severely underfunded com-
panies are ﬁrms with poor past operating performance and in relative ﬁnancial distress. These
characteristics make them similar to value companies. Unlike standard value companies, however,
underfunded ﬁrms earn low returns. Furthermore, the poor operating performance would suggest
a connection with earnings momentum. Nonetheless, prior six-month returns do not identify the
most underfunded companies as losers. Also, unlike price momentum, which is a short run phe-
nomenon, a high level of underfunding is associated with low returns up to ﬁve years after portfolio
formation. Finally, the level of accruals would suggest that underfunded companies should earn
higher returns than the rest of the sample, which is in contrast with the evidence. These issues are
further investigated in the next section.
VI. Robustness Analysis
A. Cross-Sectional Regressions
A way to statistically test whether the predictive power of FRfor returns survives when controlling
for the eﬀect of other known sources of predictability is provided by the cross-sectional methodology
of Fama and MacBeth (1973). Following this approach, we use market beta, size, B/M, past six-
month returns, SUE, and accruals as explanatory variables in cross-sectional regressions along with
FR.
As we mention in Section II, in the case of stocks with positive FR, there could be a mechanical
correlation between FR and the B/M ratio. Thus, a positive association between FR and returns
could be a manifestation of the value premium. Even controlling for B/M in the regressions does not
solve the problem, as there could be nonlinearities in the value eﬀect. To circumvent this obstacle,
22we let FR vary only for underfunded companies and replace the value of FR for overfunded ﬁrms
with zero. Furthermore, we create a dummy variable called FR(+) which is equal to one if the
company is overfunded. This dummy captures the premium in average returns on overfunded
companies relative to underfunded ones. In regressions of returns on the new FR and FR(+),
the estimated slope on FR is numerically equivalent to the slope from a regression in which the
original FR is the only explanatory variable and where overfunded companies are dropped from
the sample. When other explanatory variables are included in the regression, this equivalence does
not hold and a larger number of observations enhances the statistical power of the tests. For this
reason, we prefer to keep overfunded companies in the sample.
Another possibility to get around the mechanical correlation between FRand B/M is to deﬁne
the funding ratio in a diﬀerent way. A possible alternative is to divide the diﬀerence between assets





Given that this new variable is not related to B/M, we can let it vary freely for both under- and
overfunded companies, without running the risk of capturing eﬀects related to the value premium.
Moreover, FR  provides a robustness check for the results obtained with FR.
As for the other explanatory variables, we use a ﬁrm’s market equity at the end of December
of year t − 1 to compute its B/M ratio.12 Market equity in June of year t measures ﬁrm’s size.
Accruals are computed as in Sloan (1996) using data from ﬁscal year t − 1. The (log of the) size,
(the log of) B/M, FR, and accruals of a company are associated with the stock returns between
July of year t and June of year t + 1. Each month a ﬁrm is associated with its SUE in the most
recent quarter and with the compounded return in the prior six months (R−6).13 14 We also need
to provide an estimate of the market beta for each company. For this purpose, we follow closely the
spirit of Fama and French’s analysis (1992). We impute to each company the beta of the portfolio
to which it belongs among the portfolios formed according to the deciles of the beta distribution.
The details of this procedure are in the Appendix.
We run a cross-sectional regression for each month in the sample. The dependent variables in
the regression for month t are stock returns between months t and t+6. The slopes are computed
as the time-series average of the monthly slopes. Given that the regressions are run at the monthly
frequency and the dependent variables are six-month returns, there is serial correlation in the
estimated slopes. This fact is taken into account by adjusting the standard error of the mean with
the Newey and West (1987) procedure. The sample ranges from July 1981 to December 2003.
23Table VIII reports the results from the cross-sectional regressions. In Panel A, the funding ratio
is measured using the combination of FR and FR(+). FR , which is deﬁned with total assets in
the denominator, measures funding status in Panel B. TABLE
VIII
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The ﬁrst two models in Panel A of Table VIII conﬁrm known results in asset pricing. The
failure of beta to explain the cross-section of stock returns, which was pointed out by Fama and
French (1992), is very strong in our sample. The estimated relationship between beta and returns
is negative and insigniﬁcant. There is a negative relation between size and returns, but it is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This result is consistent with the known evidence that the small
ﬁrm eﬀect disappeared starting in the 1980s. Finally, B/M is a signiﬁcant predictor of average
returns, conﬁrming that the value eﬀect still plays an important role.
The new evidence in Panel A of Table VIII concerns the models with FRin the regression. The
estimates in the third row show that FRis a signiﬁcantly positive predictor of stock returns, even
accounting for beta, B/M, and size. The slope on the FR(+) dummy suggests that overfunded
companies as a group do not earn signiﬁcantly diﬀerent average returns, keeping the other regressors
constant. This result is the cross-sectional counterpart to the lack of signiﬁcant alphas for the OF
portfolio in the time-series analysis. Also, it is further evidence of the asymmetric eﬀect of the
funding status on average returns, for which we provide a possible explanation above.
The next three models control separately for the eﬀect of accruals, earnings momentum (SUE),
and returns momentum (R−6), respectively. Each of the variables is signiﬁcant and has the ex-
pected sign. The most signiﬁcant is SUE. What matters is that the predictive power of FR is not
altered by the separate inclusion of these regressors. Even when the control variables are included
simultaneously in the last row of Table VIII, the funding ratio remains a signiﬁcant determinant
of stock returns and the slope is unaﬀected. Incidentally, notice that prior six-month returns are
no longer signiﬁcant, probably because the eﬀect of this variable is subsumed by SUE. This fact
suggests that in our sample return momentum is largely explained by earnings momentum, which
is consistent with the results in Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996).
Panel B reports the estimates obtained using FR , the alternative measure of funding status.
The results are very similar to those in Panel A, both in terms magnitude of the slope on FR  and
in terms of its signiﬁcance. In addition, the slopes on the other explanatory variables are largely
unaﬀected by the change in the measure of funding status. Hence, the signiﬁcant relation between
average returns and funding level seems to be robust to the deﬁnition of the funding ratio.
In summary, the evidence from the cross-sectional analysis conﬁrms the signiﬁcant relation
24between the funding status and average returns of underfunded companies. Also, it reinforces
the impression from earlier sections that this phenomenon is largely independent of other known
asset pricing regularities. Finally, the cross-sectional link is robust to alternative deﬁnitions of the
funding status.15
B. Analysis by Size Groups
In the introduction, we suggest that analyst coverage, and the quantity and quality of information
in general, can interact with underfunding in determining mispricing. Both ﬁnancial constraints
and analyst coverage are negatively correlated with size. A natural question is then whether a
small size represents a necessary condition for mispricing. To answer this question, we look at the
returns on underfunded ﬁrms in diﬀerent size groups.
Firms are independently sorted by size and FR, and value-weighted portfolios are formed from
the intersection of these two sorts. Five groups of underfunded ﬁrms are formed according to
the quintiles of FR in December of year t − 1, conditioning on negative FR values. Then, all
overfunded (OF) ﬁrms are grouped together. In addition, ﬁve groups are formed on the basis of
market capitalization in June of year t, using the breakpoints of the distribution for NYSE stocks.
The thirty portfolios are reformed in July of each year. Monthly portfolio returns range from July
1981 to December 2003.
Table IX reports alphas and factor loadings from time-series regressions of portfolio returns on
the Fama and French (1993) three factors. The main evidence from the table is that the mispricing
of underfunded ﬁrms is not just limited to the smallest ﬁrms. In fact, the most underfunded
companies in all size quintiles display negative alphas. The largest mispricing is -0.94%, for the
most underfunded portfolio in the third size quintile. This intercept slightly decreases to -0.81%
when the momentum factor is included (results not reported), and stays statistically signiﬁcant.
The lack of statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated alphas for the largest portfolios of severely
underfunded ﬁrms depends on the fact that they contain fewer stocks, and therefore bear more
idiosyncratic risk. Furthermore, notice that within each size group the most underfunded portfolios
have the highest loadings on the three factors, consistent with the ﬁndings in Section III. TABLE
IX
HERE
On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that small size is not a necessary condition to
determine mispricing of underfunded ﬁrms. Rather, this condition, when it interacts with high
underfunding, can magnify the mispricing.
25VII. Conclusions
In this article we examine the issue of the eﬃcient market valuation of companies with a deﬁned
beneﬁt pension plan and ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of overvaluation for ﬁrms with severely under-
funded pension plans over the last two decades.
In particular, we show that the portfolio with the most underfunded ﬁrms earns low raw returns
relative to portfolios of ﬁrms with healthier pension plans. This phenomenon persists for at least ﬁve
years after the emergence of the large underfunding. Also, the risk-adjusted returns of this portfolio
are signiﬁcantly negative. The magnitude of the discount in returns is around 10% annually.
We interpret this evidence as being due to investors not paying enough attention to the im-
plications of the current underfunding for future earnings and cash ﬂows. The low returns we
predict are, in our view, a consequence of the fact that investors are systematically surprised by
the negative impact of the pension underfunding on earnings and cash ﬂows. As the regulatory
environment allows companies to postpone the recognition of the pension liability in earnings, the
impact on returns occurs with delay relative to the ﬁrst manifestation of the large underfunding.
Consistent with this interpretation, we provide signiﬁcant evidence of market surprises in the
period after portfolio formation. The surprises take the form of negative returns around earnings
announcements, negative standardized unexpected earnings, and lower than average revisions in
analysts’ forecasts. Also, we document that earnings and cash ﬂows deteriorate after portfolio
formation.
The most underfunded ﬁrms tend to be past losers from the point of view of returns and
operating and ﬁnancial performance. This evidence suggests that the deﬁcit in the pension plan
must have emerged from a diﬃculty for these companies to satisfy the funding requirements, which
in turn is a consequence of their poor economic performance and inability to borrow. Moreover,
the largest discount in returns seems to be associated with higher leverage. We interpret this fact
by arguing that for the most levered among the underfunded ﬁrms, the negative price adjustments
at the time of earnings surprises are larger. Given the credit constraints that most of these ﬁrms
face, cutting their cash ﬂows to fund the pension plan causes them to give up to a larger number
of value enhancing opportunities than what they would do if they could freely borrow.
Finally, through cross-sectional analysis and other descriptive evidence, we reach the conclusion
that the overvaluation related to pension plan underfunding is independent of other asset pricing
regularities such as the size eﬀect, the value premium, return momentum, earnings momentum,
and the accruals anomaly. Hence, we are inclined to believe that we have identiﬁed an additional
26layer of mispricing relative to the ones already known in the ﬁnance literature.
The anomaly that is documented in this work may have implications at both the corporate and
the macroeconomic levels. We mention here just a few of these implications. First, managers of
corporations may choose to behave strategically in the choice of capital structure at times when
market equity valuations fail to reﬂect the value of pension assets and liabilities, as our evidence
suggests. For instance, in the interest of old equity holders, managers of overvalued underfunded
companies may choose to issue equity rather than debt when raising new capital.16 Second, this
anomaly may generate ineﬃciencies in the allocation of resources, along the lines of the quotation
from Bulow, Morck, and Summers (1987) cited in the introduction. Third, in terms of public
ﬁnance, one may want to reassess the comparison between the U.S. pension system and other
alternatives, such as the more public-oriented systems in continental Europe. All these elements
seem suﬃciently important to be addressed in future research.
In our view, the fact that the aggregate pension liability has reached the astonishing level of
$380 billion gives some urgency to the need for action on the regulators’ side. For this reason,
before concluding, we address a few policy recommendations. First, an important question that
calls for a timely reply is how much of the outstanding liability is already reﬂected in stock prices.
According to our interpretation of the mispricing, this issue should be addressed by assessing how
advanced companies are in the amortization process of pension losses. If companies are lagging
behind, then large price adjustments are still to be expected. Further, regulators should increase
investor awareness of the implications of pension liabilities for company value. This informational
activity would facilitate the correct market valuation of underfunded companies, and would prevent
drastic price adjustments. In summary, we believe that any reform of the current accounting system
should aim at allowing pension funding status to be reﬂected in a ﬁrm’s income statement without
delay or excessive discretion. This change may increase earnings and, perhaps, return volatility,
but we believe the gains in terms of information diﬀusion would be substantial. Such a measure
would also foster unequivocal interpretation of the impact on earnings and cash ﬂows of a given
level of underfunding, and therefore facilitate the eﬃcient valuation of these companies.
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A. Accounting Data Deﬁnitions
There are two structural breaks in the way Compustat reports pension related items. The ﬁrst
break coincides with the reform of accounting standards introduced by SFAS 87, which changes
pension accounting eﬀective for ﬁscal years beginning after December 15, 1986. The second break
is caused by SFAS 132, which is eﬀective for ﬁscal years beginning after December 15, 1997.
For companies with ﬁscal years ending between 1980 and December 1986, the FVPA is set equal
to the content of item 245. For these years, we deﬁne the pension liability as equal to the present
value of vested beneﬁts (item 243). This deﬁnition diﬀers slightly from the PBO, as it does not
incorporate projected increases in salaries. Indeed, it corresponds to another measure of pension
obligation called Accumulated Beneﬁt Obligation (ABO).
Starting from 1987 for most companies, and before 1987 for those companies that report it, we
deﬁne the FVPA as the sum of overfunded pension plan assets (item 287) and underfunded pension
plan assets (item 296). One change introduced by SFAS 132 is that companies are not required
to report separate items for over- and underfunded plans. Hence, for ﬁscal years beginning after
December 1997, Compustat collapses the FVPA and the PBO into the corresponding item that was
previously reserved for overfunded plans. After the introduction of SFAS 87 the PBO is reported
by all companies with a DB plan (item 286 for overfunded plans, and item 294 for underfunded
plans).
As we indicated above, before the introduction of SFAS 87 the available data allow us to
construct a variable that is closer to the ABO than the PBO. Hence, the series is not entirely
homogenous as our measure of the present value of future contributions corresponds to the present
value of vested beneﬁts (item 243) up to the introduction of SFAS 87, and to the PBO afterwards.
Given that for the most part of this series the PBO is the relevant measure of pension liability,
in the text we simply label this series PBO. Results by subsamples, and other results in which we
replace the PBO with the ABO (available only up to 1997), show that the break in the deﬁnition
of the series does not seem to be crucial for the conclusions presented in the paper. All of these
results are available from the authors upon request.
28B. Betas in the Cross-Sectional Analysis
Imputing to a company the estimate of beta resulting from the available time series of returns
would cause too much measurement error because of the instability of company betas and the
amount of idiosyncratic risk. To get around this problem, we adopt a two-step procedure. In
the ﬁrst step all ﬁrms in CRSP with ordinary common equity and returns between July 1976 and
December 2003 are used to compute pre-ranking betas. A ﬁrm pre-ranking beta for year t results
from a market model in which the estimation window ends in June of year t and begins at least 24
and at most 60 months before, depending on returns availability. Then, the pre-ranking betas are
sorted to determine the deciles of the beta distribution and ﬁrms are assigned to decile portfolios
accordingly. The portfolio returns are obtained by value-weighting the stock returns from July
of year t to June of year t + 1. The sample of returns on beta-sorted portfolios goes from July
1981 to December 2003. In the second step, full sample (post-ranking) betas are computed for
these portfolios, and each company is assigned the beta of the portfolio to which it belongs. This
beta is used as an explanatory variable in the cross-sectional regression. It is important to notice
that the post-ranking betas closely reproduce the ordering of the pre-ranking betas. They increase
uniformly from 0.42 for the ﬁrst-decile portfolio to 1.61 for the tenth-decile portfolio. Moreover,
they are estimated very precisely; the standard errors are all below 0.04.
29Table I: Pension Plan Funding Over Time. The table reports mean, median, standard deviation,
minimum and maximum for the fair value of plan assets (FVPA), the projected beneﬁt obligation (PBO),
and the funding ratio (FR), for all the companies that satisfy the selection criteria exposed in Section II.
There are 36,651 company-years in the sample between 1990 and 2002. For each company the funding ratio
(FR) is the diﬀerence between FVPA and PBO divided by market value of equity at the end of the year.
The FVPA and PBO are expressed in millions of dollars.
1980-2002 1980-1990 1991-2002
FVPA PBO FR FVPA PBO FR FVPA PBO FR
Mean 484.60 440.76 0.01 275.69 233.75 0.02 743.08 691.32 -0.01
Median 38.23 34.40 0.01 21.97 17.84 0.02 73.40 71.47 0.00
S.dev. 2637.39 2452.95 0.22 1518.90 1295.33 0.18 3547.86 3339.84 0.25
Min. 0.00 0.00 -9.87 0.00 0.00 -4.62 0.00 0.00 -9.87
Max. 87524.00 92243.00 5.72 46380.31 50991.40 5.72 87524.00 92243.00 2.07
30Table II: Descriptive Statistics. In July of year t, stocks with negative FRin December of year t−1
are assigned to ten groups according to the deciles of the distribution of FR for NYSE ﬁrms. The stocks
in the ﬁrst decile are the most underfunded and the stocks in the tenth decile are the least underfunded.
The ﬁrms with nonnegative FR are assigned to the eleventh group (OF for overfunded). Value-weighted
(VW) and equally weighted (EW) portfolios are formed. FRis the diﬀerence between the fair value of plan
assets and Projected Beneﬁt Obligation in ﬁscal year ending in year t − 1, divided by market capitalization
in December of year t−1. Panel A reports the average of the annual averages of the FRof the companies in
each portfolio; the average of the annual averages of the market capitalization (in millions of dollars) of the
companies in each portfolio in June of year t; the average of the annual averages of the book-to-market ratio
(B/M) of the companies in each portfolio in December of year t−1; and the average of the annual number of
ﬁrms in each portfolio. The sample covers formation periods from July 1981 to July 2003. Panel B reports
means and standard deviations of the excess returns (return minus one-month T-bill rate) on the 25 size-
and FR-sorted portfolios. Panel C reports means and standard deviations for the returns on the four-factor
portfolios EXM, HML, SMB, and UMD. EXM is the excess return on the CRSP value-weighted index. HML
(high B/M minus low B/M) and SMB (small minus big) are the returns on the Fama-French factors. UMD
(up minus down) is the return on the momentum portfolio (long in past 12-month winners, and short in past
12-month losers). Percent returns range from July 1981 to December 2003.
123456789 1 0 O F
Panel A: Portfolio Characteristics
FR -0.468 -0.115 -0.060 -0.037 -0.024 -0.016 -0.010 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 0.065
Size 613.7 865.0 1417.9 1743.4 2355.9 2213.1 2658.8 3120.9 3555.9 5587.8 3228.2
B/M 2.07 1.44 1.12 1.03 0.91 0.88 0.79 0.74 0.69 0.60 0.92
Firms 68.3 64.5 65.2 64.8 59.7 60.4 59.7 61.4 62.7 66.0 960.4
Panel B: Returns
VW portfolios
Mean 0.42 0.56 0.69 0.88 0.83 0.85 0.60 0.81 0.79 0.57 0.62
S.dev. 7.49 6.09 5.58 4.45 4.68 4.68 5.06 5.08 5.08 5.22 4.28
EW portfolios
Mean 0.48 0.55 0.72 0.78 0.73 0.73 0.67 0.77 0.53 0.66 0.80
S.dev. 6.64 5.61 5.29 5.14 4.71 4.82 4.92 4.94 5.04 5.03 4.26
Panel C: Factors
EXM HML SMB UMD
Mean 0.61 0.43 0.06 0.86
S.dev. 4.58 3.27 3.36 4.39
31Table III: Raw Returns. In July of year t, stocks with negative FR in December of year t − 1a r e
assigned to ten groups according to the deciles of the distribution of FRfor NYSE ﬁrms. The stocks in the
ﬁrst decile are the most underfunded and the stocks in the tenth decile are the least underfunded. The ﬁrms
with nonnegative FR are assigned to the eleventh group (OF for overfunded). Value-weighted (VW) and
equally weighted (EW) portfolios are formed. FRis the diﬀerence between the fair value of plan assets and
Projected Beneﬁt Obligation in ﬁscal year ending in year t−1, divided by market capitalization in December
of year t − 1. Panel A and Panel B report compounded returns for VW and EW portfolios, respectively.
Monthly returns are compounded in the ﬁrst semester (S1), and in year i after portfolio formation (Yi).
The row labelled AR gives the average annual return over the ﬁrst ﬁve years after portfolio formation. The
sample period is from July 1981 to December 2003.
123456789 1 0 O F
Panel A: Value-Weighted Portfolios
S1 -0.55 1.88 3.44 6.67 6.38 6.71 5.14 4.04 5.61 4.88 5.22
Y1 9.36 11.68 13.67 16.89 16.60 16.15 13.29 16.08 15.72 13.03 13.94
Y2 7.17 18.64 14.69 16.99 15.29 12.61 19.40 17.42 16.13 17.91 15.27
Y3 8.23 11.76 8.55 12.86 12.68 12.40 12.83 15.05 11.87 13.53 13.44
Y4 6.81 10.62 12.83 13.31 15.75 13.89 14.98 12.43 14.04 14.15 14.36
Y5 5.52 13.45 9.96 13.15 12.78 19.07 13.73 8.86 13.17 18.38 13.49
AR 7.42 13.23 11.94 14.64 14.62 14.82 14.84 13.97 14.19 15.40 14.10
Panel B: Equally Weighted Portfolios
S1 -4.02 -1.50 1.04 1.45 2.41 2.47 2.69 3.45 1.64 3.98 4.02
Y1 10.35 11.15 14.56 15.51 15.44 14.45 14.10 14.98 11.61 13.52 16.20
Y2 12.66 14.08 15.78 17.59 18.48 15.79 15.37 15.87 15.12 15.58 17.05
Y3 7.01 12.09 12.58 13.34 9.98 13.54 14.69 11.09 11.00 12.04 13.91
Y4 7.78 14.28 11.92 15.04 14.24 11.07 12.59 12.78 13.59 14.89 15.19
Y5 6.63 13.67 10.87 13.79 16.41 11.72 13.92 9.57 14.62 13.68 14.44
AR 8.89 13.05 13.14 15.05 14.91 13.32 14.13 12.86 13.19 13.94 15.36
32Table IV: Three-Factor Model. In July of year t, stocks with negative FRin December of year t−1
are assigned to ten groups according to the deciles of the distribution of FR for NYSE ﬁrms. The stocks
in the ﬁrst decile are the most underfunded and the stocks in the tenth decile are the least underfunded.
The ﬁrms with nonnegative FR are assigned to the eleventh group (OF for overfunded). Value-weighted
(VW) and equally weighted (EW) portfolios are formed. FRis the diﬀerence between the fair value of plan
assets and Projected Beneﬁt Obligation in ﬁscal year ending in year t − 1, divided by market capitalization
in December of year t − 1. Panel A reports the constant (alpha) from a time-series regression of portfolio
excess returns on the three Fama-French factors, which the market excess return (EXM), the return on the
HML portfolio, and the return on the SMB portfolio. Both VW and EW portfolios are considered. Panel B
reports the slopes and adjusted R2 from these regressions. The sample period is from July 1981 to December
2003. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
1 23456789 1 0 O F
Panel A: Alphas
VW -0.89 -0.48 -0.26 0.16 0.16 0.15 -0.05 0.08 0.15 -0.01 -0.07
(-2.69) (-2.21) (-1.33) (0.86) (0.86) (0.93) (-0.27) (0.51) (0.87) (-0.06) (-1.24)
EW -0.68 -0.48 -0.22 -0.19 -0.11 -0.15 -0.15 -0.06 -0.30 -0.14 -0.05
(-2.61) (-2.51) (-1.30) (-1.10) (-0.77) (-1.05) (-0.96) (-0.45) (-2.19) (-1.14) (-0.55)
Panel B: Factor Loadings and R2
VW Portfolios
EXM 1.38 1.24 1.17 0.86 0.89 0.95 0.97 1.03 0.99 1.02 0.99
(16.94) (23.34) (24.48) (19.28) (19.43) (23.95) (21.60) (25.30) (23.65) (28.24) (76.31)
HML 1.03 0.60 0.54 0.44 0.29 0.28 0.14 0.23 0.11 -0.06 0.22
(8.21) (7.38) (7.34) (6.47) (4.19) (4.66) (1.97) (3.65) (1.73) (-1.16) (10.76)
SMB 0.35 0.29 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.11 -0.01 -0.14 -0.29 -0.22
(3.34) (4.17) (0.55) (0.53) (0.33) (0.72) (-1.89) (-0.12) (-2.57) (-6.18) (-12.82)
R2 0.52 0.69 0.70 0.59 0.61 0.71 0.68 0.74 0.72 0.81 0.96
EW Portfolios
EXM 1.17 1.06 1.05 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.04 1.06 0.98
(18.15) (22.48) (25.53) (23.94) (26.59) (28.62) (25.98) (30.56) (30.63) (34.00) (44.81)
HML 0.89 0.77 0.60 0.72 0.52 0.54 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.31 0.53
(9.04) (10.62) (9.52) (11.26) (9.36) (10.13) (7.18) (8.00) (7.43) (6.55) (15.96)
SMB 0.88 0.78 0.62 0.67 0.45 0.48 0.40 0.44 0.40 0.34 0.34
(10.54) (12.80) (11.72) (12.43) (9.55) (10.69) (8.18) (10.11) (9.17) (8.36) (12.18)
R2 0.62 0.71 0.76 0.73 0.76 0.79 0.75 0.81 0.81 0.84 0.89
33Table V: Four-Factor Model. In July of year t, stocks with negative FR in December of year t − 1
are assigned to ten groups according to the deciles of the distribution of FR for NYSE ﬁrms. The stocks
in the ﬁrst decile are the most underfunded and the stocks in the tenth decile are the least underfunded.
The ﬁrms with nonnegative FR are assigned to the eleventh group (OF for overfunded). Value-weighted
(VW) and equally weighted (EW) portfolios are formed. FRis the diﬀerence between the fair value of plan
assets and Projected Beneﬁt Obligation in ﬁscal year ending in year t − 1, divided by market capitalization
in December of year t − 1. Panel A reports the constant (alpha) from a time-series regression of portfolio
excess returns on four factors, the market excess return (EXM), the return on the HML portfolio, the return
on the SMB portfolio, and the return on a momentum portfolio (UMD). Both VW and EW portfolios are
considered. Panel B reports the slopes and adjusted R2 from these regressions. The sample is July 1981 to
December 2003. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
1 23456789 1 0 O F
Panel A: Alphas
VW -0.76 -0.36 -0.18 0.25 0.11 0.12 -0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.01
(-2.25) (-1.63) (-0.93) (1.38) (0.56) (0.71) (-0.24) (0.25) (0.30) (-0.07) (-0.26)
EW -0.35 -0.24 0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.08 -0.03 0.08
(-1.39) (-1.30) (0.09) (0.64) (-0.06) (0.04) (0.34) (0.49) (-0.61) (-0.23) (0.90)
Panel B: Factor Loadings and R2
VW Portfolios
EXM 1.35 1.22 1.16 0.85 0.90 0.95 0.97 1.04 1.01 1.02 0.98
(16.42) (22.73) (23.87) (18.71) (19.35) (23.70) (21.20) (25.08) (23.90) (27.74) (76.67)
HML 1.00 0.58 0.52 0.43 0.31 0.29 0.14 0.24 0.13 -0.06 0.20
(7.97) (7.10) (7.10) (6.18) (4.32) (4.72) (1.94) (3.75) (2.03) (-1.14) (10.49)
SMB 0.36 0.30 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.11 -0.01 -0.15 -0.29 -0.21
(3.45) (4.35) (0.66) (0.69) (0.25) (0.66) (-1.87) (-0.19) (-2.75) (-6.16) (-12.91)
UMD -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 -0.09 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.00 -0.05
(-1.64) (-2.30) (-1.59) (-2.31) (1.21) (0.84) (-0.09) (1.03) (2.38) (0.07) (-4.23)
R2 0.52 0.69 0.70 0.59 0.61 0.71 0.68 0.74 0.73 0.80 0.96
EW Portfolios
EXM 1.11 1.01 1.00 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.04 0.95
(17.84) (22.32) (25.71) (24.71) (26.01) (28.43) (26.01) (30.19) (31.74) (33.64) (46.09)
HML 0.83 0.72 0.55 0.67 0.50 0.51 0.38 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.51
(8.77) (10.42) (9.32) (11.41) (9.05) (9.87) (6.83) (7.67) (7.16) (6.18) (16.17)
SMB 0.91 0.80 0.64 0.70 0.46 0.50 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.35 0.35
(11.47) (13.83) (12.90) (14.28) (9.87) (11.41) (9.02) (10.64) (10.54) (8.83) (13.44)
UMD -0.31 -0.22 -0.22 -0.27 -0.10 -0.15 -0.19 -0.12 -0.21 -0.11 -0.12
(-5.57) (-5.49) (-6.18) (-7.86) (-3.00) (-4.77) (-5.70) (-4.04) (-7.42) (-3.94) (-6.34)
R2 0.66 0.74 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.80 0.78 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.91
34Table VI: Measures of Surprise. In July of year t, stocks with negative FRin December of year t−1
are assigned to ten groups according to the deciles of the distribution of FRfor NYSE ﬁrms. The stocks in the
ﬁrst decile are the most underfunded and the stocks in the tenth decile are the least underfunded. The ﬁrms
with nonnegative FRare assigned to the eleventh group (OF for overfunded). FRis the diﬀerence between
the fair value of plan assets and Projected Beneﬁt Obligation in ﬁscal year ending in year t − 1, divided
by market capitalization in December of year t − 1. Panel A reports cumulative returns around earnings
announcements. Returns are summed from one day before the announcement to one day after, and averaged
across the stocks in each portfolio during each quarter. Then, the quarterly portfolio surprises are added to
form the cumulative portfolio surprise in the period of interest. The periods that are considered range from
one quarter (Q1) to the ﬁfth year (Y5) after portfolio formation. Panel B reports risk-adjusted cumulative
returns around earnings announcements. Returns are relative to a Fama-French three-factor model, where
the factor loadings are the full sample loadings of the FR portfolio to which the stock belongs in that
formation period. The same aggregation procedure applies as in Panel A. Panel C reports standardized
unexpected earnings (the change in quarterly earnings per share from its value four quarters before, divided
by the standard deviation of this quantity over the previous eight quarters). The quarterly standardized
unexpected earnings are averaged across the stocks in the portfolios and then added over diﬀerent periods.
Panel D reports the percentage revision in analysts’ forecasts. For each company in each month, the monthly
change in the median forecast of the current ﬁscal year earnings is divided by the stock price in the previous
month. This percentage revision is averaged across stocks in the portfolio in each month and then summed
over the period of interest. The periods considered range from the ﬁrst semester (S1) to the ﬁfth year (Y5)
after portfolio formation. For each panel, the last column reports the t-statistic for the test of the hypothesis
that the diﬀerence in the quantity of interest between the overfunded portfolio and FRportfolio one is equal
to zero over the sample period. The sample period is between July 1981 and December 2003.
12345678 9 1 0 O F t-stat(OF-1)
Panel A: Cumulative Returns Around Earnings Announcements
Q1 -0.010 -0.007 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.003 1.519
Y1 -0.002 0.001 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.011 2.211
Y2 0.008 0.004 0.010 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.011 0.744
Y3 0.001 0.015 0.011 0.018 0.002 0.016 0.009 0.006 0.012 0.014 0.008 0.799
Y4 0.004 0.003 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.015 0.007 0.010 0.015 0.015 0.010 0.793
Y5 0.000 0.010 0.012 0.014 0.002 0.010 0.010 0.006 0.012 0.013 0.011 1.322
Panel B: Adjusted Cumulative Returns Around Earnings Announcements
Q1 -0.004 -0.006 0.000 0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 2.617
Y1 -0.010 -0.003 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.004 2.802
Y2 -0.004 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.984
Y3 -0.006 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.000 0.008 0.005 0.002 1.143
Y4 -0.009 0.000 0.006 0.007 0.001 0.012 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.010 0.003 1.919
Y5 -0.014 0.006 -0.002 0.006 -0.003 0.005 0.010 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.004 2.519
35Table VI: Continued
123456789 1 0 O F t-stat(OF-1)
Panel C: Standardized Unexpected Earnings
Q1 -0.076 -0.099 0.055 0.113 0.106 0.168 0.236 0.367 0.421 0.541 0.326 5.760
Y1 -0.256 -0.204 0.335 0.299 0.538 0.777 0.936 1.174 1.417 1.912 1.208 5.740
Y2 0.207 0.012 0.353 0.617 0.668 0.693 0.950 0.911 1.398 1.648 1.185 4.850
Y3 0.062 0.020 0.426 0.758 0.838 1.111 0.710 0.974 1.738 1.489 1.266 7.200
Y4 -0.157 0.260 0.140 0.898 0.699 0.653 1.010 1.040 1.236 1.700 1.139 7.509
Y5 -0.084 0.328 0.119 0.764 0.692 0.631 1.124 1.217 1.393 1.671 1.104 4.682
Panel D: Revisions in Analyst Forecast (%)
S1 -0.058 -0.033 -0.015 -0.013 -0.008 -0.010 -0.007 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.009 3.995
Y1 -0.057 -0.026 -0.010 -0.013 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 3.034
Y2 -0.047 -0.015 -0.003 -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 0.003 -0.009 -0.003 0.003 -0.005 2.473
Y3 -0.055 -0.007 -0.010 -0.007 -0.011 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 3.442
Y4 -0.024 -0.026 -0.012 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.010 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 1.424
Y5 -0.068 -0.013 -0.015 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 0.005 -0.005 -0.003 0.006 -0.004 1.993
36Table VII: Portfolio Characteristics. In July of year t, stocks with negative FR in December of
year t − 1 are assigned to ten groups according to the deciles of the distribution of FR for NYSE ﬁrms.
The stocks in the ﬁrst decile are the most underfunded and the stocks in the tenth decile are the least
underfunded. The ﬁrms with nonnegative FR are assigned to the eleventh group (OF for overfunded). FR
is the diﬀerence between the fair value of plan assets and Projected Beneﬁt Obligation in ﬁscal year ending
in year t−1, divided by market capitalization in December of year t−1. Panel A reports compound equally
weighted portfolio returns. The compounding periods range from the ﬁrst semester (-S1) and to the third
year (-Y3) before portfolio formation. Panel B reports standardized unexpected earnings (the change in
quarterly earnings per share from its value four quarters before, divided by the standard deviation of this
quantity over the previous eight quarters). The quarterly standardized unexpected earnings are averaged
across the stocks in the portfolios and then summed over diﬀerent periods. The periods that are considered
range from the ﬁrst semester (-S1) and to the third year (-Y3) before portfolio formation. Panel C reports
the average accrual to asset ratio for the companies in the portfolio. Panel D reports the ratio of total
earnings for the companies in the portfolio divided by total assets in the ﬁscal year under consideration.
Panel E reports the ratio of total cash ﬂows for the companies in the portfolio divided by total assets in
the ﬁscal year under consideration. Panel F reports the growth rate of total sales for the companies in the
portfolio. Panel G reports Ohlson’s (1980) measure of bankruptcy risk computed using accounting data for
the year under consideration. A higher value of this measure signiﬁes a higher probability of bankruptcy.
Panel H reports Altman’s (1968) measure of bankruptcy risk computed using accounting data for the year
under consideration. A lower value of this measure signiﬁes a higher probability of bankruptcy. The ﬁscal
years considered in all panels, except for the ﬁrst two, range from the third year before portfolio formation
(-Y3) to the third ﬁscal year ending after portfolio formation (Y3).
123456789 1 0 O F
Panel A: Raw Returns
-Y3 5.66 11.56 13.64 17.34 20.69 18.82 24.96 24.76 24.25 29.84 19.12
-Y2 1.08 8.24 10.45 15.22 14.67 18.58 21.37 25.81 24.97 29.83 18.17
-Y1 6.64 11.50 13.22 12.48 16.00 16.87 14.83 20.32 18.56 19.24 17.25
-S1 21.82 15.88 14.86 12.87 14.13 12.84 9.32 11.79 10.32 10.12 12.35
Panel B: Standardized Unexpected Earnings
-Y3 -0.66 -0.15 0.29 0.81 1.33 1.10 2.07 2.26 2.45 3.83 1.87
-Y2 -0.98 -0.58 -0.02 0.51 0.82 1.01 1.55 2.13 2.49 3.35 1.50
-Y1 -0.65 -0.32 -0.08 0.12 0.43 0.77 1.18 1.83 2.00 2.85 1.26
-S1 -0.03 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.17 0.26 0.40 0.52 0.60 0.33
Panel C: Accruals
-Y3 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
-Y2 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
-Y1 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04
Y1 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04
Y2 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04
Y3 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
37Table VII: Continued
1 23456789 1 0 O F
Panel D: Earnings to Assets
-Y3 0.002 0.024 0.024 0.036 0.033 0.035 0.031 0.027 0.039 0.041 0.034
-Y2 -0.004 0.014 0.030 0.033 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.034 0.040 0.039 0.033
-Y1 -0.016 0.010 0.027 0.028 0.037 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.038 0.038 0.031
Y1 -0.025 0.004 0.032 0.030 0.034 0.033 0.028 0.028 0.038 0.036 0.029
Y2 -0.001 -0.001 0.028 0.034 0.029 0.029 0.031 0.030 0.034 0.036 0.028
Y3 -0.004 0.005 0.029 0.033 0.029 0.029 0.032 0.030 0.034 0.033 0.028
Panel E: Cash Flows to Assets
-Y3 0.050 0.056 0.065 0.072 0.067 0.061 0.058 0.053 0.064 0.063 0.061
-Y2 0.045 0.046 0.071 0.070 0.070 0.062 0.060 0.059 0.065 0.060 0.060
-Y1 0.035 0.043 0.068 0.065 0.069 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.064 0.059 0.058
Y1 0.026 0.037 0.072 0.067 0.067 0.060 0.056 0.053 0.064 0.056 0.056
Y2 0.049 0.032 0.067 0.071 0.062 0.057 0.058 0.055 0.060 0.057 0.055
Y3 0.045 0.038 0.069 0.070 0.062 0.056 0.058 0.055 0.060 0.056 0.055
Panel F: Sales Growth
-Y3 0.008 0.040 0.018 0.007 0.050 0.035 0.041 0.059 0.059 0.078 0.064
-Y2 -0.002 0.034 0.049 0.030 0.055 0.052 0.076 0.139 0.119 0.069 0.058
-Y1 0.014 0.059 0.034 0.045 0.043 0.105 0.089 0.098 0.092 0.124 0.070
Y1 0.065 0.057 0.061 0.085 0.056 0.071 0.045 0.079 0.100 0.123 0.072
Y2 0.098 0.050 0.101 0.066 0.094 0.100 0.100 0.047 0.112 0.138 0.077
Y3 0.071 0.061 0.109 0.075 0.048 0.077 0.098 0.128 0.088 0.120 0.082
Panel G: Ohlson
-Y3 0.36 -0.35 -0.57 -0.69 -0.69 -0.82 -0.98 -1.05 -1.13 -1.36 -1.08
-Y2 0.61 -0.22 -0.46 -0.60 -0.54 -0.77 -0.94 -1.11 -1.12 -1.32 -1.02
-Y1 0.99 -0.04 -0.30 -0.52 -0.64 -0.67 -0.89 -1.13 -1.01 -1.33 -0.94
Y1 1.18 0.10 -0.29 -0.46 -0.56 -0.63 -0.84 -0.99 -0.86 -1.32 -0.85
Y2 1.03 0.16 -0.32 -0.48 -0.52 -0.60 -0.79 -0.88 -0.81 -1.18 -0.84
Y3 1.14 0.04 -0.28 -0.40 -0.59 -0.56 -0.60 -0.83 -0.81 -1.16 -0.83
Panel H: Altman
-Y3 1.93 2.44 2.73 2.78 2.81 3.04 3.13 3.31 3.55 4.24 3.03
-Y2 1.76 2.34 2.60 2.68 2.77 2.88 3.06 3.31 3.46 4.33 2.99
-Y1 1.43 2.15 2.44 2.56 2.63 2.77 2.96 3.35 3.35 4.35 2.92
Y1 1.37 2.10 2.45 2.54 2.64 2.76 2.93 3.15 3.22 4.07 2.86
Y2 1.52 2.16 2.48 2.59 2.68 2.76 2.84 3.08 3.08 3.85 2.84
Y3 1.53 2.30 2.51 2.47 2.70 2.72 2.71 3.09 3.03 3.66 2.84
38Table VIII: Cross-Sectional Tests. Panel A reports slopes and t-statistics (in parentheses) from
Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of six-month buy-and-hold stock returns on diﬀerent
combinations of the following explanatory variables. Beta is the post-ranking beta of the beta-decile portfolio
to which a ﬁrm belongs at the end of June of year t. Book-to-Market (B/M) is the log of book value of equity
in December of year t − 1 divided by market value of equity in December of year t − 1. Firm size (Size) is
the log of market capitalization measured in June of year t. For underfunded companies, the funding ratio
(FR) is the diﬀerence between fair value of plan assets and the projected beneﬁt obligations in the ﬁscal year
ending in year t−1, divided by market value of equity at the end of year t−1. For overfunded companies, FR
equals zero. FR(+) is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the company is overfunded. Accruals (Acc.)
are computed in December of year t−1, as in Sloan (1996). SUE are standardized unexpected earnings (the
change in quarterly earnings per share from its value four quarters before, divided by the standard deviation
of this variable over all the available observations for one company) in the most recent quarter. Ret−6 is the
compound return over the past six months. In the regressions, the same level of FR, FR(+), beta, Size,
B/M and Accruals is matched with six-month compounded returns in all the months from July of year t to
June of year t+1. SUEandRet −6 change at the quarterly and monthly frequency, respectively. In Panel B
the explanatory FR  replaces FR and FR(+). For over- and underfunded companies, FR  is the diﬀerence
between fair value of plan assets and the projected beneﬁt obligations in ﬁscal year ending in year t − 1,
divided by total assets at the end of year t−1. The reported slopes are computed as the time-series average
of the slopes in monthly regressions of compound excess returns on the explanatory variables for July 1981
to December 2003. The t-statistics are computed using Newey-West (1987) standard errors with ﬁve lags of
autocorrelation. The average number of stocks in the regressions is 1,252.
Panel A: FR





7.82 -1.25 1.56 -0.08 0.02
(2.08) (-0.80) (4.76) (-0.36) (0.08)
8.12 -1.24 1.55 -0.08 -7.96 0.02
(2.15) (-0.80) (4.83) (-0.36) (-3.50) (0.08)
7.75 -1.07 1.64 -0.10 1.70 -0.01
(2.08) (-0.69) (5.08) (-0.43) (10.48) (-0.03)
7.63 -1.54 1.43 -0.10 0.03 0.04
(2.03) (-1.05) (4.23) (-0.44) (2.70) (0.13)
-1.47 1.48 -0.09 -6.48 1.62 0.02
(-0.97) (4.38) (-0.39) (-3.15) (10.73) (1.57)
7.84 -1.40 1.53 -0.11 -6.62 1.61 0.02 0.01
(2.10) (-0.96) (4.66) (-0.46) (-3.24) (10.63) (1.58) (0.05)
39Table VIII: Continued.
Panel B: FR 
FR’ Beta B/M Size Acc. SUE Ret-6
9.12 -1.17 1.54 -0.06
(2.33) (-0.75) (4.51) (-0.27)
8.73 -1.16 1.53 -0.06 -7.35
(2.25) (-0.74) (4.56) (-0.26) (-3.35)
8.75 -0.99 1.63 -0.08 1.71
(2.26) (-0.63) (4.83) (-0.33) (10.50)
8.98 -1.46 1.42 -0.08 0.03
(2.36) (-0.98) (4.01) (-0.35) (2.57)
8.45 -1.32 1.52 -0.08 -6.05 1.63 0.02
(2.24) (-0.89) (4.41) (-0.36) (-3.11) (10.75) (1.45)
40Table IX: Double Sorting: Size and FR. In July of year t, stocks are sorted by market capitalization
as of June of year t, and ﬁve groups are formed according to the quintiles of the distribution (only NYSE
stocks are used to ﬁnd the breakpoints). Underfunded ﬁrms are independently sorted by the funding ratio
FR in December of year t − 1 and ﬁve groups are formed according to the quintiles of the distribution of
FR for companies with FR<0. All overfunded ﬁrms (FR≥0) are assigned to the OF group. Then, thirty
value-weighted portfolios are formed in July of year t from the intersection of the size and FR sorts. FR is
the diﬀerence between the fair value of plan assets and Projected Beneﬁt Obligation in ﬁscal year ending in
year t − 1, divided by the ﬁrm’s capitalization in December of year t − 1. The table reports the intercepts
from time-series regressions of portfolio excess returns on the Fama-French factors EXM, HML, and SMB.
The table also reports the estimated loadings on the three factors. The sample is July 1981 to December
2003. t-statistics are provided in parentheses.
FR Group
S i z e 12345 O F 12345 O F
Alphas Loadings on EXM
1 -0.69 -0.31 -0.12 -0.03 -0.42 -0.02 1.08 1.00 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.92
(-3.39) (-1.85) (-0.69) (-0.18) (-2.34) (-0.15) (21.43) (24.43) (22.86) (20.22) (22.84) (37.00)
2 -0.34 -0.42 0.00 -0.32 -0.22 -0.11 1.24 1.04 0.91 1.09 1.10 0.98
(-1.36) (-1.87) (0.02) (-1.82) (-1.19) (-0.99) (20.01) (18.62) (16.50) (24.95) (23.97) (37.43)
3 -0.94 -0.49 -0.06 0.14 -0.06 -0.09 1.37 1.12 1.05 1.00 1.02 1.00
(-3.21) (-2.14) (-0.33) (0.49) (-0.29) (-0.81) (18.98) (20.08) (23.59) (13.91) (20.71) (36.80)
4 -0.59 -0.03 0.17 -0.19 -0.08 -0.18 1.32 1.10 0.93 1.09 1.02 1.07
(-1.49) (-0.15) (0.98) (-0.91) (-0.36) (-1.89) (13.64) (19.37) (22.01) (20.60) (19.45) (44.28)
5 -0.38 -0.09 0.40 0.01 0.06 -0.03 1.36 0.97 0.96 1.05 0.98 0.98
(-1.09) (-0.35) (1.83) (0.03) (0.42) (-0.46) (15.65) (14.98) (17.85) (18.39) (28.83) (68.67)
Loadings on HML Loadings on SMB
1 0.84 0.76 0.54 0.58 0.47 0.59 0.91 0.82 0.76 0.75 0.79 0.73
(10.81) (12.05) (8.45) (7.70) (6.93) (15.47) (14.00) (15.45) (14.05) (11.98) (13.88) (22.70)
2 0.78 0.76 0.61 0.52 0.39 0.60 0.68 0.68 0.58 0.64 0.47 0.49
(8.17) (8.85) (7.26) (7.75) (5.56) (14.77) (8.45) (9.40) (8.18) (11.45) (7.94) (14.32)
3 0.92 0.71 0.53 0.35 0.47 0.54 0.41 0.36 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.18
(8.30) (8.29) (7.80) (3.18) (6.19) (13.00) (4.40) (5.04) (5.16) (2.19) (4.65) (5.01)
4 0.87 0.44 0.38 0.46 -0.01 0.55 0.30 0.08 0.18 0.21 0.13 -0.03
(5.86) (5.05) (5.84) (5.69) (-0.15) (14.95) (2.38) (1.06) (3.36) (3.09) (1.98) (-0.95)
5 0.71 0.66 0.23 0.08 -0.02 0.13 -0.05 0.00 -0.17 -0.23 -0.37 -0.32
(4.95) (6.73) (2.79) (0.87) (-0.46) (5.95) (-0.40) (-0.04) (-2.51) (-3.23) (-8.54) (-17.22)
41References
[1] Altman, Edward I., 1968, Financial ratios, discriminant analysis, and the prediction of corpo-
rate Bankruptcy, Journal of Finance 23, 589-609.
[2] Ball, R., and P. Brown, 1968, An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers, Journal
of Accounting Research 6, 159-178.
[3] Banz, Rolf, and W. J. Breen, 1986, Sample dependent results using accounting and market
data: some evidence, Journal of Finance 41, 779-793.
[4] Berk, Jonathan, 1995, A critique of size related anomalies, Review of Financial Studies 8,
275-286.
[5] Bergstresser, Daniel, Mihir Desai, and Joshua Rauh, 2004, Earnings manipulations and invest-
ment decisions: evidence from sponsored pension plans, NBER working paper No. 10543.
[6] Bernard, V., and J. Thomas, 1990, Evidence that stock prices do not fully reﬂect the im-
plications of current earnings for future earnings, Journal of Accounting and Economics 13,
305-341.
[7] Bulow, Jeremy, Randall Morck, and Lawrence H. Summers, 1987, How does the market value
unfunded pension liabilities?, in Z. Bodie, J. Shoven and D. Wise, eds.: Issues in Pension
Economics (Chicago: UCP).
[8] Chan, K. C., N. Jegadeesh, and J. Lakonishok, 1996, Momentum strategies, Journal of Finance
51, 1681-1713.
[9] Chan, Konan, Louis K. C. Chan, Narismhan Jegadeesh, and Josef Lakonishok, 2004, Earnings
quality and stock returns, Journal of Business, forthcoming.
[10] Dichev, Ilia D., 1998, Is the risk of bankruptcy a systematic risk?, Journal of Finance 53,
1131-1147.
[11] Fama, Eugene, 1970, Eﬃcient capital markets: a review of theory and empirical work, Journal
of Finance 25, 383-417.
[12] Fama, Eugene, 1991, Eﬃcient capital markets: II, Journal of Finance 46, 1575-1617.
42[13] Fama, E., and K. French, 1992, The cross-section of expected stock returns, Journal of Finance
47, 427-465.
[14] Fama, E., and K. French, 1993, Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds,
Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3-56.
[15] Fama, E., and J. MacBeth, 1973, Risk, return, and equilibrium: empirical tests, Journal of
Political Economy 81, 607-636.
[16] Feldstein, Martin, and Randall Morck, 1983, Pension funding decisions, interest rate assump-
tions and share prices, in Zvi Bodie and John B. Shoven, eds.: Financial Aspects of the U.S.
Pension System (Chicago: UCP).
[17] Feldstein, Martin, and Stephanie Seligman, 1981, Pension funding, share prices, and national
savings, Journal of Finance 36, 801-824.
[18] Hong, Harrison, Terence Lim, and Jeremy Stein, 2000, Bad news travels slowly: size, analyst
coverage, and the proﬁtability of momentum strategies, Journal of Finance 55, 265-295.
[19] Jegadeesh, N., and S. Titman, 1993, Returns to buying winners and selling losers: implications
for stock market eﬃciency, Journal of Finance 48, 65-91.
[20] Lakonishok, J., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1994, Contrarian investment, extrapolation, and
risk, Journal of Finance 50, 1541-1578.
[21] Ohlson, James, 1980, Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy, Journal
of Accounting Research 18, 109-131.
[22] Newey, W., and K. West, 1987, A simple positive-deﬁnite heteroskedasticity and autocorrela-
tion consistent covariance matrix, Econometrica 55, 703-708.
[23] Pastor, Lubos, and Robert Stambaugh, 2003, Liquidity risk and expected stock returns, Jour-
nal of Political Economy 111, 642-685.
[24] Sloan, R. G., 1996, Do stock prices fully reﬂect the information in accruals and cash ﬂows
about future earnings?, Accounting Review 71, 289-315.
[25] Stein, J. C., 1989, Eﬃcient capital markets, ineﬃcient ﬁrms: a model of myopic corporate
behavior, Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, 773-787.
43Notes
1Although there is a large variety of employer pension programs, they are usually classiﬁed into
one of two broad types: deﬁned contributions (DC) and deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension plans. In a
DC plan, such as a 401(k), each employee has an account in which the employer, and possibly the
employee, makes regular contributions. The employee has some degree of discretion concerning the
type of asset in which these contributions are invested. The total beneﬁt the employee receives
at retirement depends on the level of contributions and the performance of the portfolio in which
they have been invested. In contrast, in a DB plan the beneﬁt that the employee is entitled to
at retirement is determined by a formula which takes into account the employee’s years of service,
present and future salaries, etc. The employer must set aside funds to meet beneﬁts at retirement.
These contributions are invested in assets at the sole discretion of the employer.
2The fundamental source of pension accounting regulation is the Statement of Financial Ac-
counting Standards number 87 (SFAS 87) issued in 1985, whose principles are consistent with
previous accounting practices.
3According to SFAS 87, the amortization period will be the average remaining service period
of active employees expected to receive beneﬁts under the plan. If all, or almost all, of a plan’s
participants are inactive, the average remaining life expectancy of the inactive participants shall
be used instead of average remaining service.
4In computing the funding status, ERISA compares the market value of plan assets to the present
value of future pension obligations. For a plan that is less than 90% funded, ERISA requires the
sponsoring ﬁrm to make an additional contribution to the plan to reduce the funding deﬁciency
within three to ﬁve years. There are some exceptions, however. If a plan is over 80% funded today,
and was more than 90% funded for the past two years, the additional contribution requirement is
44waived. Furthermore, companies may request a hardship waiver or an extension period over which
to meet the normal and additional contribution requirements.
5In fact, the approach of Bulow, Morck, and Summers (1987) is somewhat diﬀerent as they
take into account the endogeneity issues implied by regressing market value on variables, such as
the pension plan funding status, that are simultaneously determined with the market value itself.
These authors adopt an event study methodology, and test whether an exogenous change in interest
rates has a diﬀerent impact on the market value of companies with diﬀerent levels of funding in
their pension plans. However, this methodology is not suitable to conclude whether the extent to
which the market incorporates information into prices is consistent with correct valuation.







For a given level of the ﬁrst ratio and positive FR, a higher FR corresponds to a higher B/M ratio.
We are grateful to the referee for making this point, which aﬀected the ﬁnal choice of our research
design.
7The latest aggregate data about portfolio allocation of DB pension plans, along with other
aggregate statistics on U.S. pension plans, can be found in the “Private Pension Plan Bulletin
Abstract of 1998 Form 5500 Annual Reports,” which is published by the U.S. Department of
Labor.
8The time series of the market return, HML, SMB, and the momentum factor (UMD) come from
Prof. K. French’s website, where the details on the construction of these portfolios are provided.
9Concerning this last point, we have separate evidence, available upon request, that the average
FR for portfolio one ﬁve years after formation is still as low as -26%.
4510Using a six-month moving average of the revision in Equation (7), while decreasing the number
of stocks for which we have nonmissing values, would not change the results.
11Following Dichev (1998), we deﬁne Altman’s (1968) Z-score as: Z = 1.2(working capital/total
assets) + 1.4(retained earnings/total assets) + 3.3(earnings before interests and taxes/total as-
sets) + 0.6(market value of equity/book value of total liabilities) + (sales/total assets). Ohlson’s
(1980) index is deﬁned as: O = - 1.32 - 0.407log(total assets) + 6.03(total liabilities/total assets)
- 1.43(working capital/total assets) + 0.076(current liabilities/current assets) - 1.72(1 if total li-
abilities > total assets, else 0) - 2.37(net income/total assets) - 1.83(funds from operations/total
liabilities) + 0.285(1 if net loss for last two years, else 0) - 0.521(net incomet - net incomet−1)/ ( |net
incomet| + |net incomet−1|).
12Book-to-Market is computed as Compustat book value of shareholders’ equity in ﬁscal year
t − 1 (item 216) divided by market capitalization in December of year t − 1.
13To maximize the number of observations in this exercise, we standardize earnings surprises by
the standard deviation of all available surprises for one ﬁrm.
14Hence, to be included in our tests in July of year t, a ﬁrm needs to have a CRSP stock price
for December of year t − 1 and June of year t. The stock must also have monthly returns for at
least 24 of the 60 months preceding July of year t in order to compute pre-ranking beta estimates.
Moreover, the accounting variables needed to compute B/M, FR, accruals, and SUE must also be
available. Finally, we drop observations for which FR, B/M, size, accruals, and SUE are more than
three standard deviations away from the mean.
15We have separate portfolio results (available upon request) indicating that severely underfunded
ﬁrms still display large negative alphas, when FR , rather than FR, is used as the sorting variable.
For example, the alpha for the equally weighted portfolio one from the three-factor model is -0.42%
46(t-statistic = -2.13). In general, the sorting by FR  produces alphas that are smaller in absolute
value than the sorting by FR. As argued in the introduction, we impute this diﬀerence to the fact
that using market capitalization as the denominator identiﬁes companies that are more likely to
be in a situation of ﬁnancial distress, and for which there is less information diﬀusion, given their
smaller size. Financial distress would magnify mispricing through the eﬀect of credit constraints.
The same reduction in cash ﬂows, which is needed to fund the plan, may have a larger impact on
the value of a ﬁrm with restricted access to credit.
16Evidence of managers’ strategic behavior with respect to pension items is provided by Bergstresser,
Desai, and Rau (2004). Speciﬁcally, these authors show that managers alter the assumed rate of
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Figure 1: Aggregate pension plan funding over time. The graph reports the diﬀerence between
aggregate assets (FVPA) and aggregate beneﬁts (PBO), for all the companies in Compustat with available
observations. The quantities are expressed in billions of dollars.
48